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I.  INTRODUCTION
This special issue of the Duke Environmental Law and Policy
Forum on sustainable development and environmental justice could
hardly have better timing, as commentators are calling increasingly
upon the United States to make sustainable development the basis
for a new generation of environmental law.1  This spring’s National
Town Meeting led by the President’s Commission on Sustainable
Development (“PCSD”)2 may well mark the beginning of a major
American campaign to tap sustainable development’s exceptional po-
tential.  
In this article, I explore the nexus between sustainable develop-
ment and another “revolution” in environmental law: the prolifera-
tion of state and federal policies designed to combat the
“brownfields” phenomenon (the existence of abandoned or underu-
tilized urban sites that sit idle in part due to concerns over environ-
mental contamination).3  Brownfields sites remain idle in part be-
1. See Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in Asia, 33 U. RICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 48, on file with author) [hereinafter Boer, The Rise]
(sustainable development can lead to the next “great revolution of environmental law”); John
C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance (forthcoming
1999) [hereinafter Dernbach, Sustainable Development]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 992-95 (1997) [hereinafter Ruhl, Thinking of Envi-
ronmental Law] (proposing sustainable development as a policy principle for a revolutionized
environmental law, and stating, “[s]ustainable development, . . . must be a deliberate practice in
today’s world—a guiding principle for all social decisions.”).  
Other nations are creating environmental policies that incorporate sustainable develop-
ment principles.  See, e.g., Ben Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development:
The Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action,
31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307, 342-57 (1995) [hereinafter Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically
Sustainable Development] (discussing strategies for implementing sustainable development in
Australia).
2. The PCSD has been the locus of considerable activity on implementing sustainable
development in the U.S.  See Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV’T 83, 83-84 (1997) (PCSD’s co-chair describes its establishment and activities).
3. See Joel B. Eisen, “Brownfields of Dreams”?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary
Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 890 n.20 [hereinafter Eisen,
Brownfields of Dreams].  See also William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism,
and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4 n.1 (1997)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Institutional Determinism] (setting forth a similar definition).  Brownfields
literature is expanding exponentially.  In one noteworthy recent piece, Michael Allan Wolf dis-
cusses the “curious and potentially dangerous intersection” between brownfields laws and poli-
cies and federal enterprise zone policies.  Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State
Brownfields Recycling and Federal Enterprise Zoning, 68 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming
1999) (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
For a use of the term “revolution” with respect to brownfields, see Scott H. Reisch, Reap-
ing “Green” Harvests From “Brownfields”: Avoiding Lender Liability At Contaminated Sites:
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cause of the threat of liability for brownfields developers under
CERCLA or its state analogues.4  The consequences of this threat in-
clude the migration of jobs and tax revenues to suburban
“greenfields” locations.5  Thus, states and the federal government are
developing and implementing policies designed to promote the rede-
velopment of brownfields sites, such as voluntary cleanup programs,
prospective purchaser agreements, innovative funding arrangements,
and so forth.
Both foci of this special issue—sustainable development and en-
vironmental justice—are directly relevant to any discussion of brown-
fields.  The link between brownfields and sustainability seems obvi-
ous. The Clinton Administration has recently incorporated major
features of Vice President Al Gore’s “livability agenda.”  In its recent
high-profile announcement proposing increased devolution of envi-
ronmental funds to state and local governments, this set of initiatives
aimed at promoting “smart growth” authorizes $9.5 billion for
“Better America Bonds” designed for reclaiming brownfields (among
other purposes).6  Reusing unproductive urban land instead of spoil-
ing “greenfields” land comports with the Brundtland Report’s defini-
tion of sustainable development.  In the words of the PCSD, which
adopts the Brundtland formulation,7 “Brownfields reuse and redevel-
opment promotes urban revitalization and reduces the development
pressures on greenfields.”8  How brownfields laws and policies
                                                                                                                                     
Part I, COLO. LAW., Jan. 26, 1997, at 3 (terming “the brownfields revolution” a “reaction to the
harshness of [CERCLA]”).
4. See, e.g., Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 899 n.71.
5. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 890-98; see also Buzbee, Institu-
tional Determinism, supra note 3, at 1.
6. See  E. J. Dionne Jr., “Smart Growth” Politics, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1999, at A29; Ju-
dith Havemann, Gore Proposal Aims to Tame Urban Sprawl; $10 Billion in Bonds Would Help
to Finance Communities Open Spaces, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1999, at A2 (The environmental
initiative “is expected to be a major theme of [Gore’s] campaign for the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination”).
7. See Lash, supra note 2, at 84.  See also William A. McDonough & Michael Allan Wolf,
Allen Chair Symposium 1996: The Future of Environmental and Land-Use Regulation: Inter-
view: A Dialogue on Design, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1071, 1079-80 (1996) (describing the PCSD’s
process of defining sustainability).
8. See President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New
Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the Future (last modi-
fied Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/PCSD/publications/TF_Reports/amer-
top.html> [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE AMERICA]; see also TIMOTHY BEATLEY & KRISTY
MANNING, THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE: PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND
COMMUNITY 53-54 (1997) (noting that “[i]n the sustainable community, greater attention is
directed toward using those lands already committed to the urban fabric more efficiently,” and
describing brownfields initiatives, but terming them “controversial and [to] be considered with
caution.”).
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evolved also seems important.  Commentators agree that creating
new domestic environmental laws and retooling existing ones is nec-
essary for sustainability.9  They also find that relying on state and lo-
cal actors is important.10  Surely there can be no better implementa-
tion of both principles than a set of laws that transforms CERCLA
and its state analogues and creates innovative partnerships between
the public and private sectors.
Governmental and private sector pronouncements of a connec-
tion between brownfields and sustainability are not hard to find.  The
Environmental Protection Agency seemingly cannot describe any of
its brownfields policies without pairing the phrases “sustainable” and
“reuse of brownfields.”11  The multi-agency “Brownfields National
Partnership Action Agenda” contains a list of initiatives of federal
agencies and departments designed to promote “sustainable reuse”
9. In those nations where development of environmental law lags behind the U.S., Pro-
fessors Ben Boer and Nicholas Robinson see implementing laws as an important first step for
sustainable development. See generally Boer, The Rise, supra note 1 (discussing sustainability
and the evolution of environmental laws in China, Vietnam and the Asia Pacific region);
Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative Environmental Law: Evaluating How Legal Systems Ad-
dress “Sustainable Development,” 27 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 338 (1997).
On the need to revisit existing environmental laws to achieve sustainability in the U.S.,
see, for example, J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World Envi-
ronmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 273, 288 n.46 (1998) [hereinafter Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance].
10. See McDonough & Wolf, supra note 7, at 1079-80 (comment of McDonough, an archi-
tect noted for his views on sustainability, that “to paraphrase Tip O’Neal, ‘all sustainability is
local.’ ”).  See also Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of
Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development
Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175, 203-
204 (1996) (“ [T]he participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a determining fac-
tor in fulfilling [Agenda 21’s] objectives.”); Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note
9, at 289 n.48 (citing the Brown article).
11. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields Mission (last modified
Feb. 25,  1998) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/mission.htm> (“EPA’s Brownfields Initiative
will empower States, communities, and other stakeholders in economic development to work
together in a timely manner to prevent, assess, safely cleanup and sustainably reuse brown-
fields”); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, New Revolving Loan Fund Pilots (last modi-
fied July 31, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/brownfld/newloan.htm> (“EPA’s Brown-
fields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF) pilot program is designed to enable eligible
states, cities, towns, counties, U.S. territories, and tribes to capitalize revolving loan funds to
safely clean up and sustainably reuse brownfields.”); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
State, Local, and Tribal Projects (last modified Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/epapages/
epahome/partners.htm> (stating inter alia that “this program encourages economic develop-
ment and cooperation to prevent, assess, safely cleanup, and sustainably reuse brownfields.”).
See also Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 286 n.36 (citing brownfields
funding as an example of sustainable development policy).  For an example of a state program
attempting to link the two, see Robb H. Layman and Charles J. Northrup, Survey of Illinois
Law: Environment, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 879, 909 (1998).
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of brownfields.12  The PCSD’s initial report (Sustainable America)
lists a recommendation and three “action items” to spur brownfields
redevelopment.13  The influential American Society for Testing and
Materials  (“ASTM”) has developed a draft “Standard Guide to the
Process of Sustainable Brownfields Redevelopment.”14  As for envi-
ronmental justice, Professor Richard Lazarus terms the EPA’s
brownfields policies “plainly the [EPA’s] most visible effort” to re-
spond to activists’ concerns.15
But which brownfields programs will really lead to sustainable
cities?  Perhaps all, perhaps none; no one can say for sure.  Any ar-
gument that all brownfields redevelopment is inherently sustainable
is unjustified.  As I demonstrate in Part II, for example, a brownfields
program that deemphasizes the role of public participation is not
“sustainable development”.  Moreover, without a hard law of sus-
tainable development, we must be skeptical about any program’s
claim to sustainability.  In this article, I develop a framework for
thinking of brownfields policies as a cornerstone of our nascent sus-
tainable development law.  My analysis begins in Part I with a short
summary of brownfields law and policy, and a description of our cur-
rent understanding of “sustainable development.”  There is no hard
and fast definition of the term, but it is increasingly more clear that a
body of sustainable development “law” will take shape as the product
of a host of decisions made now and in the near future.
12. See Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda (last modified May 13, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/97aabref.htm#sustainable>.
13. Policy Recommendation 9 of Chapter Four of  Sustainable America suggests the fol-
lowing:  “Revitalize brownfields—which are contaminated, abandoned, or underused land—by
making them more attractive for redevelopment by providing regulatory flexibility, removing
process barriers, and assessing greenfield development to reflect necessary infrastructure
costs.” President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New Consen-
sus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the Future, Strengthening
Communities (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/PCSD/publications/
TF_Reports/amer-chap4.html>  
14. See John M. Scagnelli, Draft Guide Proposed on Sustainable Brownfields, NAT’L L.J.,
Mar. 16, 1998, at B8 (discussing draft ASTM Standard E-50.03); Standards Setter Weighs in on
Approach to Brownfields, THE BROWNFIELDS LETTER, Nov. 1998, at 5.
In the brownfields arena, the ASTM established credibility with its 1994 standard E-1527-
94 (Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assess-
ment Process), which was widely used to govern the initial phase of risk-based cleanups at
brownfields sites. See id.; see also Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 931 n.208
(discussing the widespread adoption of the ASTM Phase I standard).
15. See Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 716 (1997).
Both the ASTM and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (“NEJAC”) have
made recommendations designed to respond to environmental justice concerns.  See infra Part
II.
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The optimal way to ensure that brownfields programs mesh with
this body of law—whatever it turns out to be—is to incorporate basic
norms of sustainable development about which there is widespread
agreement.  Those agreed-upon norms are the following: brownfields
programs should simultaneously consider social, economic and envi-
ronmental issues; they should substantively ensure a sustainable ur-
ban future; and last but certainly not least, they should strive for and
achieve “equity.”  In Part II, I elaborate on these core concepts and
suggest how they should be interpreted in the brownfields arena.  I
explain my preference for creating an expanded federal role in over-
seeing states’ brownfields programs, adopting state schemes to en-
sure the long-run protectiveness of brownfields cleanups, and facili-
tating broad-based public participation in the brownfields reuse and
remediation process.  My central premise is that proposals which I
and others have made to achieve these ends can be understood
(though not explicitly designed as such) as attempts to comport with
core principles of sustainable development.  As such, I find an inde-
pendent justification for reforming brownfields programs to incorpo-
rate these principles.
II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND BROWNFIELDS POLICIES
Brownfields sites include abandoned industrial facilities and va-
cant properties, and are concentrated in older industrial cities of the
Northeast and Midwest.16  A plethora of state and federal initiatives
aim to spur brownfields redevelopment; one could easily say that the
enthusiasm for recycling brownfields has attained the status of a
“movement.”17  Though the federal government has been active, the
primary initiators of change have been the states.18
16. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 890-95.  See also Robert H.
Abrams, Comment: Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 265, 277-80 (1997) (discussing the origins of the brownfields problem and types of
brownfields sites); Buzbee, Institutional Determinism, supra note 3, at 1.
17. See Madeline June Kass et al., Brownfields: Where The Market Makes Green, 13 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 345, 345 (1998) (“The brownfields movement is replete with a diverse
assemblage of private, governmental, and community stakeholders and an equally diverse set
of challenges and opportunities.”).
18. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 915 n.153.  See also Buzbee, Institu-
tional Determinism, supra note 3, at 27-46 (describing “first mover” dynamics to explain how
states took the lead in brownfields law and policy).
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A. State Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Federal Initiatives
Since 1988, almost forty states have developed voluntary cleanup
programs (“VCPs”) through statutory and regulatory reforms in-
tended to speed up the cleanup of brownfields sites.19  No two states
have identical programs and most differ widely in terms of the
cleanup process and its requirements,20 but the VCP process, broadly
speaking, is similar in most states.21  State programs are voluntary and
usually commence with a developer’s22 expression of intent to investi-
gate and remediate a brownfields site in the state’s program.  Fol-
lowing an investigation to determine the level of contamination, the
developer remediates the site to meet “generic”23 or site-specific
cleanup standards, or concludes the process if remediation is not nec-
essary.24  At the end of the process, the developer receives liability
protection from the state25 but none from the federal government, ex-
19. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 13.
20. See Standards Setter Weighs in on Approach to Brownfields, supra note 14, at 5 (citing
consultant Michael Taylor’s comment that “state laws vary considerably”). Since I last counted
the formal voluntary cleanup programs, see Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at
app., several states have either amended or established programs.  See, e.g., 2 BROWNFIELDS
LAW AND PRACTICE (Michael Gerrard ed., 2 vols. 1998); BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis,
eds. 1997) [hereinafter ABA BROWNFIELDS GUIDE] and STRUCTURING REAL ESTATE
WORKOUTS: ALTERNATIVES TO FORECLOSURE (1998 supp.) for descriptions of state pro-
grams.  
21. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 920 (“Despite widespread varia-
tions, there are some common features in each of the states’ programs.”).  See also Buzbee, In-
stitutional Determinism, supra note 3, at 55 n.217.
22. I use the term “developer” to refer generally to any participant in a state VCP, in-
cluding the current owner of the brownfields site.  See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra
note 3, at 894 n.32.
23. A “generic” cleanup standard is established on a statewide basis and allows a devel-
oper to remediate the site to a predetermined level, based on the type of contamination found
at the site and the contaminated environmental medium.  See, e.g., Eisen, Brownfields of
Dreams, supra note 3, at 939-42.  State statutes often require notice-and-comment rulemaking
for decisions to establish these technical standards.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3746.04(B)(1) (Anderson 1995) (directing the preparation of rules to establish cleanup stan-
dards).
24. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 920.
25. See id., supra note 3, at 950-65.  Liability protections range from “no action letters”
(letters promising that the state will refrain from enforcement actions) to certificates of satisfac-
tory completion of the process, releases and covenants not to sue.  See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 7, § 26C-3.3, app. A § V(7) (1996) (developer may receive a “no further action statement”);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(6) (West 1996) (developer may receive a release from
state liability); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A) (Anderson 1996) (covenant not to sue);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.15(a) (West 1996) (certificate of completion for par-
ticipants in the Expedited Remedial Action Program).
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cept in those states with whom the EPA has agreed to refrain from
pursuing enforcement actions.26  This brief summary of the brown-
fields remediation process does not account for the many variations
in individual states, some of which I discuss in Part II.
On the federal level, there is considerable activity to promote
brownfields redevelopment and reuse.  The EPA’s “Brownfields
Economic Redevelopment Initiative” features a wide array of initia-
tives.27  These include (among others): (1) guidance designed to limit
risks for property buyers through the use of prospective purchaser
agreements;28 (2) pilot projects pursuing strategies to “test redevel-
opment models; (3) special efforts directed toward removing regula-
tory barriers without sacrificing protectiveness; and (4) facilitation of
coordinated site assessment, environmental cleanup and redevelop-
ment efforts at the federal, state, and local levels.”29  Another initia-
tive is “Brownfields Showcase Communities” which enables certain
cities to serve as laboratories to “promote environmental protection,
economic redevelopment and community revitalization through the
assessment, cleanup and sustainable reuse of brownfields.”30  Con-
gress has created a targeted tax deduction for brownfields redevel-
opment31 and reduced the risk of liability under CERCLA for lenders
that become involved with brownfields sites.32  It has also unsuccess-
26. At present, only 11 states have signed agreements with EPA Regional Offices that
would preclude such enforcement actions.  See infra note 108 and accompanying text
(discussing these “Superfund Memoranda of Agreement”); see also Superfund Memoranda of
Agreement (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
27.  For discussions of federal brownfields initiatives, see Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams,
supra note 3, at 979-84 and Wolf, supra note 3, at 15-16.  See also United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Brownfields Homepage
(last modified March 12, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/index.html>.
28. See Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property
and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995).
29. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, Brownfields Pilots (last modified March 12, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov
/swerosps/ bf/pilot.htm>; Eisen Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3 at 980-82; Wolf, supra note
3 at 15 (discussing the pilot projects which are funded at up to $200,000).
30. Id. See also Wolf, supra note 3, at 16.
31. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 941(a), 111 Stat. 882, estab-
lished a tax deduction for certain “qualified environmental remediation expenditures” includ-
ing some expenses that would otherwise have to be amortized over several years.  See generally
Andrea Wortzel, Greening The Inner Cities: Can Federal Tax Incentives Solve The Brownfields
Problem?, 29 URB. LAW. 309 (1997).
32. The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of
1996, (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) creates an exemption from
CERCLA liability for a lender that takes any of certain enumerated actions to protect its secu-
rity interest in a contaminated site.  See also STRUCTURING REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS:
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fully attempted to craft a brownfields bill as part of a comprehensive
overhaul of CERCLA or as a stand-alone bill.33
B. The Link to Sustainability
Brownfields programs have achieved the ‘90s equivalent of legal
permanence: prominent display on state and federal regulators’ Web
sites.34  In this section, I consider how these programs should be
measured against an understanding of “sustainable development”
that has changed in roughly the same time span as brownfields pro-
grams have arisen.
The widely cited Brundtland Report defines sustainable devel-
opment as meeting the needs of the present without adversely af-
fecting future generations.35  Obviously, this definition does not tell us
                                                                                                                                     
ALTERNATIVES TO FORECLOSURE (Supp. 1998) for a comprehensive discussion of the Act and
cases arising after the Act’s enactment.  See generally Joseph M. Macchione, Comment, Lender
Liability Under CERCLA in Light of the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit In-
surance Protection Act of 1996: Does the Act Spell Lender Relief or Continued Heartburn?, 16
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 81 (1997).
33. One commentator counts “twenty-five to thirty separate brownfields bills [introduced]
in the past two sessions [of Congress].”  Tara Burns Koch, Comment, Betting on Brownfields:
Does Florida’s Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into Opportunity?, 28
STETSON L. REV. 171, 189 (1998).  Recent CERCLA reauthorization bills have included pro-
posals designed to address brownfields redevelopment.  See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, su-
pra note 3, at 984-88 (criticizing brownfields proposals in H.R. 2500, introduced in the 104th
Congress); Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration: Who Should Pay?, 18 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 77, 94 (1998) (a “liability limitation [for brownfields developers] has
been floated at least since 1994 in a Clinton administration Superfund reauthorization bill . . .
.”).  These bills failed to be adopted for reasons described in an excellent article in this journal.
See Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund Amendment and Re-
authorization: How is the Clinton Administration Handling Hazardous Waste?, 8 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 245 (1998).  See also James E. Satterfield, A Funny Thing Happened On The
Way To The Revolution: The Environmental Record of the 104th Congress, 27 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,019, 10,028-30 (Jan. 1997) (describing the failure of CERCLA reauthori-
zation proposals in the 104th Congress).
34. For a typical state brownfields homepage, see Maryland’s Voluntary Cleanup and
Brownfields Incentive Program (visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http://www.mde.state.md.us/
environment/was/brownfields.html>.
35. See WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 87 (1987)
[hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].  The Brundtland Report defines sustainable develop-
ment as follows:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.  It contains
within it two key concepts: (1) The concept of “needs,” in particular the essential
needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and (2) The
idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the
environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.
Id. at 87.  See also Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 17-18 (manuscript); A.
Dan Tarlock, Symposium: Sustainable Development in Latin American Rainforests and the Role
of Law: Article: Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource:
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much about how to translate its normative statement into law.  But in
the past decade, sustainable development has evolved from this con-
cept into a detailed framework for requiring simultaneous considera-
tion of economic, social and environmental factors in decision-
making.  Even though the argument over the concept and its defini-
tion still rages, a set of important core principles can be derived from
the efforts to flesh out sustainable development’s specifics.
1. “Sustainable Development”: More Than A Mere Concept . . .
The most comprehensive effort to refine the concept of sustain-
able development was the 1992 United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED), which yielded two important
documents: the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,36
which contains twenty-seven principles designed to advance sustain-
able development, and the more comprehensive “Agenda 21”37 which
contains a forty chapter framework of goals and objectives for sus-
tainable development.  Included in the framework of Agenda 21 are
specific actions nations should take to achieve a core goal of simulta-
neous consideration of social, economic, and environmental factors in
decision-making.38  Additionally, the proposed IUCN Draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Environment and Development,39 if adopted as
                                                                                                                                     
The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 37, 52 (1997)
(stating that this is the “current working definition of sustainable development”).
36. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.151/5/REV. 1 (1992),  reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992).
37. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA
21, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 1512/PC/100/ADD.1 (1993) [hereinafter AGENDA 21].
38. See Robert F. Blomquist, Virtual Borders? Some Legal-Geo-Philosophical Musings on
Three Globally Significant Fragile Ecosystems Under United Nations’ Agenda 21, 45 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 23, 24 (1997)(“Agenda 21 was intended by its drafters to be ‘a comprehensive action
plan on sustainable development.”); Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Develop-
ment, supra note 1, at 313; Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 18-19, 27
(manuscript) (arguing that Agenda 21’s principles are the basis for an “ambitious intergenera-
tional social, economic, and environmental compact”); Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance,
supra note 9, at 291 n.54 (“The greatest contribution the United Nations has made to the proc-
ess of translating the international rhetoric into domestic policy is its Agenda 21 document . . .
.”); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52 n.86 and sources cited therein.  Professor John Dernbach has
thoroughly analyzed Agenda 21 and recommended U.S. actions to implement it.  See John C.
Dernbach et al., U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review, 27
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,504 (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter Dernbach, Agenda 21].
39. WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ENV’T AND
DEV’T (1995) [hereinafter IUCN DRAFT COVENANT]; for the text of the covenant, see New
Treaty In The Making (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.sovereignty.net/p/sd/covenant.htm>.
Article 1 of the draft covenant states its explicit objective is to promote sustainable devel-
opment, claiming that it is necessary “to establish integrated obligations to achieve the envi-
ronmental conservation and sustainable development necessary for humans to enjoy a healthy
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an international treaty, would elevate sustainable development from
its current soft law status to an international requirement.40
After all this activity, sustainable development still has not been
universally accepted as a blueprint for action.  Critics call it a
“manipulative and confusing slogan,”41 a “myth,”42 a utopian re-
former’s fantasy,43 a “meaningless post-hoc label used to justify the
continuation of the status quo,”44 or even a buzzword concealing a
threat to roll back existing environmental laws.45  Some see it as oxy-
moronic, arguing that if one accepts “development,” or the now out
of fashion “sustainable growth,” one submits to ever-expanding con-
sumption of scarce resources.46  Thus, developing nations may see
sustainable development as an imposition on them that allows devel-
oped nations’ wasteful policies to continue.47  This relies on an out-
moded notion of sustainability as a concept pertaining only to the
                                                                                                                                     
and productive life within nature.” IUCN DRAFT COVENANT, at art. 1.  See also Nicholas A.
Robinson, IUCN’s Proposed Covenant on Environment & Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 133 (1995) (describing the origin of the draft covenant).
40. The draft covenant, which has yet to be submitted for ratification by the U.N. General
Assembly, would “convert the ‘soft-law’ recommendations of Agenda 21 into legally binding
‘hard’ international law.”  New Treaty In The Making, supra note 39, at 1.
41. See Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from Federal Regulation of
Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 3 n.9 (1995) [hereinafter
Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism] (quoting William Goldfarb, Watershed Management:
Slogan or Solution, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483, 483 (1994)).
42. See, e.g., Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Wasn’t the Future Wonderful? Resources, Environment,
and the Emerging Myth of Global Sustainable Development, 2 COLO. J. INT’L. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 35, 36 (1991).
43. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 3, at 48 (terming the goal of sustainable development “lofty
(perhaps utopian)”).
44. See Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52 (noting that implementation of sustainable develop-
ment can either advance its goals or amount to nothing).
45. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 280 n.13 and sources cited
therein.
46. Earlier definitions of sustainable development, including the Brundtland formulation,
tended to attract this criticism.  See, e.g., Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable De-
velopment, supra note 1, at 317 (criticizing the Brundtland definition “because it invites narrow
interpretations such as ‘sustainable economic development,’ without explicitly requiring con-
cern for or focus on the continued viability of ecosystems”); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sus-
tainable Development: Integrating Economics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 261,
277 (1995) (reaching a similar conclusion).
47. See, e.g., PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 200 (1993) (“Some leaders of
developing countries still fear that an international environmental compact would be a new
strategy by the industrialized world to keep them in economic subjugation and to erode their
hard-won sovereignty.”); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52-53.  Developing nations lodged the same
criticism against the draft “Earth Charter” prepared as a follow-up to the Rio Declaration and
Agenda 21.  See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Benchmark Draft of the Earth Charter: Interna-
tional Environmental Law at the Grassroots, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 109, 112 (1997).
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maintenance of resource stocks48 which ignores both the normative
force of simultaneous consideration of social, economic, and envi-
ronmental factors and the importance of the equity component.49
The criticism would have more bite if we had termed it “sustainable
environment” or “sustainable economy,” as we “would have opened
up a rehash of the old preservationism versus resourcism debate that
paralyzed environmental law for decades.”50
Critics also deplore the vague definition of “sustainable devel-
opment.”  No one would doubt there is considerable confusion on
this point.51  One scholar has discovered at least seventy different
definitions, none of which offer much in the way of precision.52  It
does not help to say that Agenda 21’s forty chapters “define” sustain-
able development; resolving the ambiguities in its hundreds of pages
of specific proposals is “a bit like being told to follow through on the
Bible.”53  However, the definitional imprecision may not matter in the
end.  Professor J. B. Ruhl argues forcefully that we should treat
“sustainable development” as we do “democracy”54 by refusing to
48. See, e.g., Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism, supra note 41, at 3-4.  Of course,
problems related to resource depletion, overconsumption of resources, and pollution are inte-
gral to discussions of sustainable development.  See, e.g., Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically
Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 316-17 (quoting JEREMY CAREW-REID ET AL,
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR THEIR
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 17 (1994)).
49. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 279-80.
50. Id. at 279.
51. See, e.g., Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at
317-318 (discussing the definitions advanced in The Future of Environmental Regulation: Our
Common Future, Caring For The Earth, and by the Australian government); Gerald Torres,
Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & COM. 597, 618
(1996) (“Sustainable development is a complicated area in which there is still considerable dis-
pute over the basic terms of the debate, including the definition of the concept of sustainability
itself.”).
52. See generally Smith, supra note 46 (setting forth and discussing various definitions, and
proposing a preferred defintion).  For an American example, see UNITED STATES ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Region 10, Sustainable Communities Mission, Definitions
for Sustainability (visited July 8, 1998) <www.epa.gov/r10earth/offices/oi/definit.htm> (setting
forth ten definitions, including those of the Brundtland Report and the PCSD).
53. Daniel C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 103, 111 (1996).  See also Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Earth Summit: What Went
Wrong at Rio?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1017 (1992) (stating that in 1992 “the legal and policy
ambiguities raised by the issue of sustainable development were not adequately discussed,
much less resolved”).
54. Professor Ruhl argues, “[W]e do not demand detailed ‘definitions’ of democracy and
justice in order to agree that they are useful concepts that should be expressed as international,
national, provincial, and local goals for addressing those social problems.”  Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 995.
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allow definitional vagueness to prevent translating a broadly under-
stood concept into hard law.55
2.  . . . But Still Less Than Hard Law
Despite the lingering criticism, sustainable development is an
idea with staying power.56  In a previous issue of this journal, Profes-
sor Ruhl sizes up the current status of sustainable development law in
the U.S.  He argues that any policy idea travels through seven
“degrees of relevance” on its way toward becoming hard law; at the
seventh degree, policy is enshrined in law.57  In this taxonomy of
transformation, sustainable development has at best reached the
stage where “important governmental authorities establish the norm
as an explicit policy goal.”58
A recent book claims a comprehensive approach to sustainable
development would operate on three dimensions, featuring varying
scales, with an “equal concern” for sustainability at local, regional,
and national levels;59 multiple sectoral foci, with policies that address
different sectors of the economy such as transportation and housing;
and actions designed to take effect in different spheres of influence
(e.g., public and private sectors).60  There is no such comprehensive
approach to sustainable development in the U.S..  Professor John
Dernbach concludes that Agenda 21 “has had little discernible effect
on U.S. law and policy.”61  The PCSD’s reports, for example, have
had little concrete impact on lawmakers.62
55. See id.  See also Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 276 (“[T]he
relevance of an idea in the real-world sense can become entrenched, and the development of its
law inevitable, well before there are clear technical measurements and a coherent body of law
to apply.”).
56. See Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism, supra note 41, at 4.  See also Dernbach,
Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 29; Nicholas A. Robinson, Attaining Systems for
Sustainability through Environmental Law, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 86, 86 (1997)
[hereinafter Robinson, Attaining Systems For Sustainability] (noting that despite the “‘hype’,
there is substantial evidence of measurable progress toward the objective of ‘sustainable devel-
opment’”); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 53 (noting that “despite its flaws, sustainable develop-
ment has displayed ‘legs’”).
57. See generally Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9.
58. Id. at 284-87.
59. BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8, at 23.
60. See id.
61. Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10507-8.
62. While the PCSD’s reports have not yielded hard law, and few of their recommenda-
tions have been followed, they have had some impact at the federal level.  See, e.g., Ruhl, The
Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 286-87 (detailing PCSD’s Sustainable America’s
impact on a variety of federal agencies).
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No state or federal agency has anything resembling a sustain-
ability strategy.63 The general impression one gets of the atmosphere
surrounding sustainable development efforts is of the energy and un-
certainty of . . . the early years of personal computing.64  State and
federal regulators use “sustainable” and “sustainable development”
as if everyone understands what they mean, which is hardly the case.
Surf any agency’s Web site65 and observe that “sustainability” en-
compasses a wide-ranging assortment of new and existing programs:
a notice of a $5,000 grant to a local urban forestry unit, a request for
comments on a complicated energy deregulation package, or, per-
haps, a description of a state’s brownfields program.  The Web site of
the EPA’s Office of Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities
(OSEC)66 lists programs and initiatives under the heading “Integrated
Approaches,” including case studies of community sustainability pro-
grams, projects on climate change issues, and efforts to develop sus-
tainable community indicators, to name just a few.67  While that is a
commendable list of projects, there is no consistent effort to link sus-
tainability and the EPA’s regulatory programs.68
On occasion, a governmental program appears to be a more con-
scious effort to incorporate the substance of sustainable develop-
63. Some states have begun to develop statewide sustainability strategies.  A Virginia
General Assembly resolution of 1993 paved the way for the development of a Blueprint for
Sustainable Development of Virginia, which “provides a state-wide vision for protecting the
Commonwealth’s resources.” Sustainable Development Explored in Virginia (last modified Oct.
29, 1998) <http://www.eli.org/archive/planstat.htm>.
64. I am old enough to remember when the Atari personal computer was touted as the
way of the future.  See Chris LaMorte, Game Over, DENVER WESTWORD, Oct. 10, 1996
(mourning the passing of “the last remaining exclusive Atari dealer in Colorado,” and stating
“[h]is beloved [computer] has joined the ranks of the eight-track and the Betamax”).
65. The Internet is an important forum for discussions about sustainability.  Besides offi-
cial regulatory pronouncements, there is considerable activity online by individuals, non-profit
groups and others sharing information and describing projects.  For example, “E-Design On-
line” (an electronic online magazine) maintains Surfing Your Way to Sustainability, its list of 13
“super sites” for sustainability information.  Surfing Your Way to Sustainability (last modified
Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.fcn.state.fl.us/fdi/e-design/online/9712/reviews/susweb1.htm>.
A comprehensive source of online information is the U.S. Department of Energy’s
Center of Excellence for Sustainable Development.  Center of Excellence for Sustainable Devel-
opment (last modified May 9, 1997) <http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/>.
66. The OSEC “mission is to foster the implementation of integrated, geographical ap-
proaches to environmental protection with an emphasis on ecological integrity, economic sus-
tainability, and quality of life – otherwise known as Community-Based Environmental Protec-
tion (CBEP).” Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities (last modified May 9, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppe/osec/osecbak/>.
67. See id.
68. For example, there is no discussion of brownfields law or policy; one needs to consult
the EPA’s brownfields page.  See id.
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ment.69  Some notable examples are the EPA’s grant programs aiming
to spur creation of innovative frameworks to guide urban develop-
ment.  The EPA’s “Sustainable Development Challenge Grant” pro-
gram funds projects “to promote long-term investment in sustainable
development” in such areas as developing “regional governance
processes for better management of urban development.”70  The
brownfields analogues are the EPA-funded pilot projects,71 some of
which seem to have been designed with sustainability objectives in
mind.  For example, the Portland, Oregon project has set out to in-
volve a broad spectrum of community members in brownfields deci-
sions.72
It is important, however, to differentiate between a governmen-
tal program that advances components of the sustainable develop-
ment agenda and one that reflects “a conscious effort to craft an inte-
grated sustainable development approach.”73  The pilot projects,
unfortunately, fall into the former category.  Though many have
yielded promising ways to conduct site assessments and remediation
planning, the $200,000 funding ceiling ensures each project rarely
does more than create a mechanism for governing remediation activi-
ties at a demonstration site.74  These and other EPA sustainability
69. Professor Ruhl notes this trend with respect to certain recently enacted federal envi-
ronmental laws.  See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 288 n.46.
70. The SDCG program objectives include “partnering among community members, busi-
ness and governmental entities to work cooperatively to develop flexible, locally-oriented ap-
proaches that link place-based environmental management and quality of life activities with
sustainable development and revitalization.” Financial and Technical Resources: 1998 SDCG
Federal Register Notice - Solicitation of Proposals (last modified Nov. 9, 1998)
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/osec/osechome.nsf/all/g-sdcg.html>.  Brownfields-related projects are
eligible for grants. See id. See also Matthew W. Ward et al., National Incentives for Smart
Growth Communities, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 325, 327 (1998).
71. See also Ward et al., supra note 70, at 327 (discussing the Sustainable Development
Challenge Grant program and the Brownfields Action Agenda pilot projects).
72. See Portland Brownfields Initiative: Community Strategies to Recycle Land (last modi-
fied Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.brownfield.org/>.  See also Wolf, supra note 3 at 23 n.92
(noting that recent solicitations for brownfields pilot proposals call inter alia for “applications
that demonstrate the integration or linking of . . . pilots with . . . local sustainable development .
. . programs”).
73. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 288 n.46.
74. See, e.g., Region 3 Brownsfields Pilots: Richmond, VA (last modified July 27, 1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/richmond.htm> (describing the efforts of Richmond,
Virginia, one of the first three pilot project cities, to “[d]evelop[] a site specific property recy-
cling strategy in partnership with current/future site owners and users, government regulatory
agencies, and the City’s development staff”).
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programs are simply not comprehensive enough to amount to an or-
ganized effort to implement Agenda 21.75
3. A Prudent, “Adaptive” Approach To Attaining 
Sustainability
Without sustainable development “law,” there are no adverse
consequences to employing nominal means for bringing sustainability
about, or even maintaining a certain fuzziness about the definition of
sustainability.  At the “fifth degree of relevance,” the idea of sustain-
ability may have pervaded the collective governmental consciousness,
but it is still just that—an idea.  Consequently, there is still a wide
range of perspectives on sustainability programs.  To sympathetic
commentators, they are embryonic formulations of strategies and
goals.  To critics, they are slapdash uses of the “sustainable” label or
even cynical post hoc justifications of existing programs.
Where do we go from here?  Professor Ruhl’s article provides
milestones for assessing our progress toward the “hard law” stage,
but he observes quite correctly that “it is far too early to predict the
outcome in terms of the finished product . . . .”76  We are in a phase of
“extreme nonlinearity” where “we must choose between alternate
policy paths, none of which appear indisputably superior . . . and all
of which involve high levels of uncertainty.”77  By contrast, brown-
fields has made it to the seventh degree of relevance, with its cornu-
copia of state and federal law.  We thus find ourselves at a crossroads
of sorts.  Do we need to agree about sustainable development’s par-
ticulars before we can proceed to remediate brownfields?  That is,
should an idea at a higher degree of relevance pause and let a less de-
fined idea “catch up”?
Professor Ruhl believes that we do not need to define sustain-
able development in consummate detail before proceeding.  That
view is, however, not universally accepted.  Professor Dernbach, for
example, claims sustainable development is so revolutionary that it
literally requires us to reformulate our entire structure of govern-
ance.78  In his view, if we seek to build a sustainable society, we need
to reinvent our current laws, beginning with a commitment by gov-
ernmental entities at all levels to develop omnibus sustainability
75. See Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10,508.  Besides their limited scope, few
EPA sustainability initiatives “have the force of law.”  See Koch, supra note 33, at 190.
76. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 293.
77. See id.
78. See generally Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1.
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strategies.79  This “total makeover” approach would address the lack
of consistency among laws so frequently decried by commentators.80
Those who want to “reinvent” regulation81 could agree to start over
with sustainable development as an organizing principle.
However, this policy path is an unlikely one.  Historically, envi-
ronmental law has shown a propensity to evolve in a nonlinear fash-
ion that defies our attempts to impose order.  Likewise, sustainable
development law surely will develop through a similar process of
evolution and experimentation.  As one commentator observes, the
“framework of a new paradigm of [sustainable development] law
cannot be built in the proverbial ‘day.’”82  Two of our foremost envi-
ronmental law scholars have called upon other disciplines to explain
this dynamic: Professor William Rodgers invokes the metaphors of
evolutionary biology,83 and Professor Ruhl relies on the “complex
adaptive systems” theory to illustrate environmental law’s intrica-
cies.84  Professor Ruhl endorses an experimental approach to sustain-
79. See id. at 33.
80. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 93-94 (1990) (observing that “failures of coordination” lead to
“inconsistency and incoherence in the law”).
81. See id.at 84-102 (for a comprehensive discussion of the many criticisms of governmen-
tal regulation (including environmental statutes and regulations)); see also Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 980-91 (discussing “a plan for the revolution” of environ-
mental law that focuses on a number of perceived and actual shortcomings of the present
regulatory structure).
For discussions of regulatory reform initiatives, see generally Bradford C. Mank, The En-
vironmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need
for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1998); Robert V. Percival, Responding to
Environmental Risk: A Pluralist Perspective, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 526-27 (1997); Rena
I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command
to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998). See also Ruhl, Thinking of Environ-
mental Law, supra note 1, at 986-87.
82. Robinson, Attaining Systems For Sustainability, supra note 56, at 140-41.
83. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Mythology: The Law of
Salmon in the Pacific Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J. 821 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Envi-
ronmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lessons of the Red Squirrel: Con-
sensus and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 161
(1989); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception
in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 FLA. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377 (1989).
84. Professor Ruhl’s scholarship focuses on “complex adaptive systems” theory: the “body
of literature and research devoted to ‘the study of the behavior of macroscopic collections of
[interacting] units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in time.’” Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 936 n.8 (quoting PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD,
FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY 7 (1995)).  Complexity theory aims to understand how complex
systems—including legal systems—behave.  See id. at 938.  By definition, a complex system is
dynamic and non-linear. See id. at 936.
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ability programs, championing “adaptive management”—“‘the con-
cept of experimentation to the design and implementation of natural-
resource and environmental policies’”85—as the process for attaining
sustainability.  Ruhl comments that, “we do not really know how to
get to either a sustainable economy or sustainable development.
Failure to experiment, in other words, would be folly.”86  Others
might call this a path toward achieving a solution for a “second-best”
world.87
Brownfields proponents are quick to argue that this is exactly
what they are doing: experimenting and reinventing law in the states’
“laboratory of ideas.”88  But, it is important that this reinvention in-
corporates the core principles of sustainable development.  Experi-
ments in the brownfields arena will only crystallize into a body of sus-
tainable development law if these core principles are included and
followed.89  To argue otherwise is to run the risk of negative conse-
quences stemming from the failure to adopt sustainable development
as an organizing principle.  We may disagree about the details of sus-
tainable development, but “[w]ithout some clarity and social consen-
sus about the characteristics of [sustainable] places, it will be difficult
to achieve a more positive result . . . [Sustainable development] is a
                                                                                                                                     
Professor Ruhl’s insights are elaborated further in J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Ar-
row of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Di-
minishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 405 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State,
45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe
the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1407 (1996).
85. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 996 (quoting KAI N. LEE,
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53 (1993)).
86. Id.
87. For a provocative discussion of “second-best” theory, see John J. Donohue III, Sym-
posium on Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: Some Thoughts on Law and Economics
and the General Theory of Second Best, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 257 (1998) (introducing sympo-
sium on the theory and articles on pollution taxes and public utility regulation).
88. This usage stems from an insight by Justice Brandeis.  See New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (stating that, “It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country”). See also Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Developing Enforcement of Federal Envi-
ronmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2383 (1996) (observing that, “Rare is the proponent of
devolution [of environmental policy-making to the states] who does not refer to Justice Bran-
deis’s observation that one of the benefits of federalism is that it allows states to serve as labo-
ratories of democracy for novel social and economic experiments”).
89. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 293-94.
Spring 1999] BROWNFIELDS POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES 205
better model for planning and managing in the future, and [a] vast
improvement over our current way of thinking about communities.”90
Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of hindsight from fu-
ture decades, when there may well be a fully developed body of sus-
tainable development law.  For all we know, any of today’s experi-
ments could be a precursor to a more evolved understanding of
sustainable development, a false start or even a detour from the cor-
rect policy path.  Many earnest attempts to provide guidance follow
an Agenda 21-like strategy, articulating an all-things-to-all-people list
of prerequisites for sustainability.  But other scholars have done an
outstanding job of distilling the mandate of sustainable development
down to three prerequisites for any program claiming to be a founda-
tion of sustainable development law.  The first prerequisite builds
upon the notion that regulators must make a “concerted effort to
progressively integrate governmental decisionmaking [sic] on envi-
ronmental, social, and economic issues . . . .”91  The second prerequi-
site reflects the reality that governments must ensure that policy de-
cisions actually further sustainable development goals.  The final
prerequisite recognizes that programs must be designed to achieve
“equity,” the third element of the sustainable development agenda.
In Part III, I deal with each of these elements in turn.
III.  BROWNFIELDS AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE PROCESS OF
EXPERIMENTATION
In this Part, I discuss the brownfields initiatives designed to
lessen the fear of liability under state and federal environmental laws.
This body of law is hardly monolithic.92  Indeed, variations are so sig-
nificant that one cannot claim all brownfields policies are equally
consistent with sustainable development principles.  Thus, the inquiry
begun in Part I is squarely in focus: what sustainable development
principles matter, and how should the evolving hard law of brown-
fields reflect them?  One thing is clear.  If we continue to follow the
status quo, the consequences may be serious.  Under existing brown-
fields policies, thousands of sites may be remediated in state VCPs in
a manner dangerous to urban residents.
90. BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8, at 39.
91. Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10507.
92. Of course, the same could be said of other brownfields initiatives. See, e.g., EDITH M.
PEPPER, LESSONS FROM THE FIELD: UNLOCKING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL WITH AN EN-
VIRONMENTAL KEY 20-30 (1997) (listing ten types of public sector financing for brownfields
projects).
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A.  Brownfields Programs Require Procedures Designed To Integrate
Simultaneous Consideration Of Economic, Environmental, and
Equity Goals (“Procedural Integration”)
The first core principle emanates from Chapter 8 of Agenda 21,
“one of the more important sections of the document in terms of le-
gal implementation of sustainable development, . . .”93   Chapter 8
calls upon governments to:  integrate environment and development
at the policy, planning and management levels; adopt a national
strategy for sustainable development; provide an effective legal and
regulatory framework; make effective use of economic instruments in
market and other incentives; [and] establish systems for integrated
environmental and economic accounting.94
Like most of Agenda 21, this principle is vague.  What govern-
mental policies count, and how do they “integrate environment and
development”?  Doesn’t much of modern American environmental
law implement this mandate, i.e., the environmental impact state-
ment requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”) serving to “[i]ntegrate environment and development,”95
the Clean Air Act emissions trading system incorporating market in-
centives,96 and so forth?
Interpreting Chapter 8, Professor Dernbach reaches a different
conclusion.  He calls upon governments at all levels to foster
“procedural integration” by creating processes for simultaneous and
coordinated consideration of social, environmental, and economic
goals.97  A key feature of this is curbing regulatory tunnel vision.  In
this view, governments have fundamental responsibilities to ensure
93. Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 323.
94. See id. at 324.
95. Several commentators have termed NEPA a precursor to an American sustainable
development ideal.  See Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10520 (NEPA is “part of the
legal and policy foundation necessary to build [a U.S. sustainable development] strategy.”);
Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 278 n.10 (“NEPA may play an impor-
tant role in rediscovering a pre-existing national commitment to . . . sustainable develop-
ment.”).
96. Title IV of the Clean Air Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7671 (1996))
created the market-based system for trading sulfur dioxide allowances.  See generally, James E.
Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1994); Henry E. Mazurek, Jr.,
The Future of Clean Air: The Application of Futures Markets to Title IV of the 1990 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (1994).
97. Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 47; compare Eileen Gauna, The
Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 3, 50 n. 214 (1997) (calling for integrated decision-making with respect to hazardous waste
disposal site locations).
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consideration of all environmental costs and benefits from a project’s
inception, in order to avoid making unsound and irreversible deci-
sions at an early stage.98  Integrated procedures also require coordina-
tion of decision-making authority to prevent a government’s right
hand from not knowing what the left hand is doing, as is the case, for
example, when a national agriculture ministry subsidizes wasteful
practices and leaves it up to the environment ministry to clean up the
damage.99  As Professor Dernbach demonstrates masterfully, many
American environmental laws do not fully measure up to the stan-
dards of procedural integration.100
In considering “procedural integration” in the brownfields set-
ting, I examine three significant steps: how states administer brown-
fields cleanups; how, with federal oversight, states determine clean-
ups’ sufficiency; and how, if at all, localities review projects.
1.  The EPA’s Failed Attempt to Insist on Uniform VCP 
Procedures
When the brownfields remediation process begins, developers
have already calculated project benefits and costs.101  States are not
usually required to second-guess these assessments, confining their
involvement with developers’ applications to a completeness review.
Often, there is also little meaningful review during the remediation
process itself.  Some states require developers to enter into enforce-
able consent agreements; others involve the state extensively in ap-
proving work plans and supervising the cleanup process.  These states
98. See id.; see also BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8, at 38 (“Sustainable Places Re-
flect and Promote a Full-Cost Accounting of the Social and Environmental Costs of Public and
Private Decisions.”); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 53 (“[T]he major challenge posed by the theory
of sustainable development has been to systematically and permanently incorporate the full
environmental consequences of resource use into the modern economic concepts that help to
structure the politics of resource allocation.”).
99. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 46.  But see Torres, supra
note 51, at 616 (discussing the 1994 Executive Order on environmental justice and contending
that “the requirement of inter-agency cooperation in data gathering and in the formulation of
the problems that the agencies must address . . . will help prevent the development of agency
myopia [and] help illuminate how particular decisions of one agency or another produce envi-
ronmental consequences  . . .”) (footnote omitted).
100. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 47-51. NEPA is an excellet
example of this failure of procedural intergration. Given NEPA’s lack of substantive bite, Pro-
fessor Caldwell is justified in his observation that “the principles and goals declared by NEPA
will need reinforcement to work toward the goal of attaining a sustainable future.” Lynton K.
Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1998).
101. Several leading texts on brownfields redevelopment provide extensive advice on esti-
mating the costs of brownfields projects.  See, e.g., ABA BROWNFIELDS GUIDE, supra note 20.
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are in the minority.  Most allow the developer to operate more or less
independently with little or no state oversight beyond a review of
documentation submitted at the end of remediation activities.102
The typical process thus falls far short of the procedural integra-
tion ideal.  Throughout the life of the project, states delegate respon-
sibility for making significant decisions about environmental, eco-
nomic, and equity issues to developers.  With the state’s role being
minimized or deferred to the end of the project, the process fails to
consider costs and benefits ab initio or conduct full environmental ac-
counting throughout the process.103
No single governmental agency engages in the searching project
review required under Agenda 21.  Of course, that is exactly what
states want.  They traffic in the late-90s lexicon of lightening govern-
mental burdens: VCPs are designed to “streamline” redevelopment104
or “reduc[e] process barriers.”105  Elaborate procedures would only
hamper the goal of returning brownfields sites to commerce.
Given the states’ resistance to integrated procedures, the federal
government is the only actor capable, by invoking its mandate under
CERCLA, of ensuring that brownfields redevelopment achieves sus-
tainable development’s procedural objectives.106  But federal in-
volvement in overseeing brownfields cleanups is anathema to the
states,107 as shown perhaps most vividly by a recent debacle involving
an EPA policy proposal.
In September 1997, the EPA promulgated a draft guidance
102. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 965-70 (discussing three levels of
state involvement in VCPs, and contrasting procedures adopted in “high” involvement states to
those of “low” involvement states where developers act essentially independently); but cf.
Koch, supra note 33, at 196 (the new Florida statute “differs from other voluntary cleanup ini-
tiatives that permit the purchaser to instigate and implement a brownfields cleanup with little
or no government involvement . . . ”).
103. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at 47-48.
104. See Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment:
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 707 (1994).
105. See SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 8, at 20.
106. See Buzbee, Institutional Determinism, supra note 3, at 61 (“[I]f a national goal of pro-
tection from hazardous substances remains, limited federal oversight of Brownfields and state
cleanup initiatives is appropriate.”).
107. See, e.g., Mark D. Anderson, The Limits of Innovative Cleanup Laws: A State Update,
ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, Mar. 1997, at 5 (“Involving the federal authorities
(and an additional layer of bureaucracy) is, however, an unattractive option for a cleanup being
conducted under state authority.”).
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document108 specifying conditions under which it would enter into an
amended “Superfund Memorandum of Agreement” (“SMOA”)  be-
yond those already in place with eleven states.109 A SMOA delineates
the nature of federal-state relations with respect to cleanups of sites
on the National Priorities List (“NPL”).110  In SMOA amendments,
the EPA provides protection against federal liability for VCP partici-
pants by agreeing to refrain from pursuing enforcement actions at
certain brownfields sites successfully addressed in VCPs.111
The EPA received 78 comments on the draft, many calling for its
withdrawal.  One former state official stated bluntly, “[i]f the bureau-
crats in EPA have a lick of common sense they will rescind this guid-
ance.”112  He was not alone.  Other commenters termed the draft
108. See Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda of Agreement
(SMOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495 (1997)
(hereinafter EPA Draft SMOA Guidance).
109. See id. at 47498-500.  The existing SMOA amendments follow a structure similar to
that of the SMOAs themselves, clarifying state and federal agencies’ responsibilities at VCP
sites.  For example, the SMOA addendum entered into between the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency (MPCA) and EPA Region V designates the MPCA as the lead agency for clean-
ups taking place under the authority of Minnesota’s VCP, the Voluntary Investigation and
Cleanup (VIC) program.  See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 964 n.348
(discussing the adoption of the Minnesota SMOA addendum).
110. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47497.  See generally HAROLD C.
BARNETT, TOXIC DEBTS AND THE SUPERFUND DILEMMA 96-99 (1994) (describing states’ re-
sponsibilities for such activities as identifying candidate sites for the NPL and taking lead roles
in certain cleanups).  The NPL is “the list, compiled by EPA pursuant to CERCLA section 105
[42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1998)], of uncontrolled hazardous substance releases in the United States
that are priorities for long-term remedial evaluation and response.” EPA Draft SMOA Guid-
ance, supra note 108, at 47497.  A SMOA “is not a site-specific document,” but “attachments
may address specific sites.”  Id.   See generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1998) (SMOA regulations).
111. The language proposed for each SMOA amendment regarding liability protection was
the following:  “EPA does not generally anticipate taking removal or remedial action at sites
involved in State Voluntary Cleanup Programs addressed by a signed EPA/State Superfund
Memorandum of Agreement.”  EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47497.
Commenters criticized the promise to “generally” refrain from enforcement action as
vague and amounting to an unenforceable “policy statement.”  See, e.g., id. at 47498 (public
comment of Richard W. Collins, Director, Waste Management Administration, State of Mary-
land, Department of the Environment, MOA-2-43, at 2); see also Anderson, supra note 107, at
4 (“Unfortunately, then, the typical SMOA does not commit the EPA in any way to honor a
cleanup in a state VCP”).  This limitation on liability was expressly made subject to four
“reopeners,” which commenters termed so broad that the EPA could act virtually whenever it
considered it necessary.  See, e.g., Jean Koeninger, Manager, Superfund Branch, Hazardous
Waste Division, Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology, Comment on EPA
Draft SMOA Guidance, EPA Docket MOA-2-70) (describing the EPA’s “implied threat”).
112. Clinton W. Willer, Former Director, Division of Superfund, State of Tennessee
Author, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, Oct. 10, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-6, at 2
[hereinafter Willer Comment] (copy on file with author).
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guidance a “disastrous mistake”113 that would do “severe damage to
state brownfield initiatives”114 and “create further obstacles to
achieving brownfields redevelopment.”115
The first area of controversy was the EPA proposal to limit its
approval to lower-risk brownfields sites.  The guidance featured a
multi-step “screening process” for states to use to distinguish be-
tween higher-risk “Tier I” sites and lower-risk “Tier II” sites; only
the latter would be eligible for liability protection.116  The EPA also
stated, “[i]f the EPA subsequently determines that a site was im-
properly classified as ‘Tier II’, the [liability protection] do[es] not ap-
ply.”117  This proposal drew strong criticism from many commenters
who feared it would empower the EPA to substitute its judgments
about environmental costs and benefits for those of the states.118  The
EPA proposed to make its judgments in a manner consistent with its
CERCLA mandate, intending to differentiate sites with “greater po-
tential to require long-term or emergency cleanup work under the
Federal Superfund program”119 from those earning its sign-off.  This is
113. See id. at 1.
114. Alan C. Williams, Ass’t Atty. Gen., Minnesota, on behalf of eight state attorneys gen-
eral, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance,  Oct. 24, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-27 at 5
[hereinafter State Attorneys General Comment].
115. Mark D. Anderson, Counsel, The Greenfields Group, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA
Guidance, October 9, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-7. The influential Environmental Council of
the States (ECOS) called upon the EPA to “withdraw the Guidance in its current form,”
terming it “an unprecedented federal intrusion into the conduct of state cleanup programs
which serves to undermine effective state initiatives to address the reuse and redevelopment of
contaminated properties.”  Id. at 3 (public comment of Robert E. Roberts, Executive Director,
Environmental Council of the States, MOA-2-4).  ECOS, whose members consist of 51 state
and territorial environmental commissioners, was formed in 1993 to promote an increased state
role in environmental policy-making.  See Tom Arrandale, Pollution Control Has Been Steadily
Propelled Away From Washington to the States, GOVERNING, Oct. 1997, at 36.
116. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47496 (discussing the qualification
on the liability limit); id. at 47502 (the screening process “consists of multiple steps in which
each successive step involves more detailed information about a site and its environs”); id. at
47502-06 (outlining the screening process).  See also Anderson, supra note 107, at 4 (EPA Re-
gion 4 had suggested a site screening process to Kentucky during SMOA negotiations).
117. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47498.
118. The U.S. Conference of Mayors, for example, commented it was “fundamentally op-
posed to any up front tiering of sites.”  J. Thomas Cochran, Executive Director, U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, October 24, 1997, EPA Docket
MOA-2-23 at 3 [hereinafter U.S. Conference or Mayors Comment].  See Robert J. Eaton,
Chairman, Detroit Renaissance, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, September 30,
1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-25 at 1 (claiming the EPA could pursue an enforcement action at
every brownfields site)[hereinafter Detroit Renaissance Comment].
119. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47501.  States criticized the Tier I
definition for taking into account such factors as a site’s proximity to a day care center.  See id.
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an important analysis that would have allowed for consideration of
all environmental impacts of brownfields projects.
Recognizing the extensive differences in VCPs, the EPA had
also agreed to sign off only on sites remediated in approved programs
which contained six specified features.120  This drew heavy fire from
commenters, one of whom observed that the federal baseline would
“give[ ] EPA veto power over state laws.”121  The EPA planned to
approve a VCP only if it “provide[d] opportunities for meaningful
community involvement . . . responsive to the risk posed by the site
contamination and the level of public interest,” including notice and
other requirements.122  The EPA’s proposal recognized that many
VCPs require notice or a brief notice-and-comment period, while
others require no public outreach efforts whatsoever.123  Thus deci-
sions on site uses and cleanup standards are often precluded from
community scrutiny, the first issue having been decided by develop-
ers and the second often determined by a generic cleanup standard.124
The EPA’s attempt to bring community members into the process
was overwhelmingly rejected as tending to “indirectly impose cost
and procedural impediments on brownfields developers.”125  
Other criteria called on states to “provide adequate oversight to
ensure that voluntary response actions . . . are conducted in such a
manner to assure protection of human health, welfare and the envi-
                                                                                                                                     
at 47502 (factors leading to designation as a Tier I site); State Attorneys General Comment,
supra note 114, at 3.
120. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47497  (“This guidance is intended
to be flexible enough to accommodate variability among State voluntary cleanup programs;
however, the guidance does describe a minimum set of criteria that a State voluntary cleanup
program should meet before EPA signs an MOA with the State concerning its voluntary
cleanup program.”).  The draft guidance also recognized that brownfields policies are con-
stantly changing, providing for periodic EPA reviews of its approval and for a review if a state
made “significant changes” to its VCP.  Id. at 47498-99.
121. Gov. E. Benjamin Nelson, Chair, Comm. on Nat. Res. and Gov. Mark Racicot, Vice
Chair, Comm. on Nat. Res., Nat’l Governor’s Ass’n, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guid-
ance, Oct. 3, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-22 at 1.
122. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108 at 47499.  Ten methods of public in-
volvement were deemed acceptable.  Id.
123. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 972-77 (discussing public participa-
tion provisions in VCPs).  See generally BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 20
(discussing state VCP public participation requirements and comparing them to those of
CERCLA).
124. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 998-1020.
125. Detroit Renaissance Comment, supra note 118, at 2.  While most commenters objected
to requiring public participation, not all did so.  See U.S. Conference of Mayors Comment, su-
pra note 118 at 4 (the minimal requirement of notice gave localities flexibility); Mary Beth
Tuohy, Ass’t Comm’r., Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guid-
ance, Oct. 24, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-52 at 2.
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ronment . . .” by, among other means, incorporating the CERCLA
preference for permanent cleanups, and including “a requirement
that the State program receives progress reports on site conditions, or
[reserves] the State program’s right to conduct site inspections.”126
The states rejected these proposals.  Once again, they resisted any
EPA role in deciding whether a brownfields cleanup protects human
health and the environment.127  As I demonstrate more fully in the
next section, the EPA proposal responded to an important proce-
dural shortcoming of state programs, namely,  the lack of consistent
and effective means to guarantee that cleanups remain protective
over time.128
Bowing to the inevitable, the EPA withdrew the draft in Janu-
ary 1998.129  Though no one recognized it as such, this experience can
be reconceptualized as an early battle to stake out positions in the
evolution of sustainable development law.  One could easily recast
the EPA’s proposals on major areas of disagreement as attempts to
bring “procedural integration” to the brownfields process, and states’
responses as demonstrating strong resistance.  After this debacle,
there is no consistent “procedural integration” in brownfields poli-
cies, nor can most developers have the protection from CERCLA li-
ability they desire.
To break this logjam, some change along the substantive lines of
the failed guidance is necessary.  The brownfields process need not
be federalized.130  Instead, Congress could either amend CERCLA to
126. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47,500.
127. See, e.g., David B. Struhs, Comm’r., Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, Mass. Dept. of
Envtl. Protection, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, Oct. 23, 1997, EPA Docket
MOA-2-16 at 5 (calling the EPA’s attempt to impose these criteria “condescending”).
128. See infra notes 145-169 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of ensuring
protectiveness of brownfields cleanups in the future).
129. See Withdrawal of Proposal: Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memo-
randa of Agreement Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, Memorandum From
Timothy Fields, Jr., Acting Ass’t Adm’r., EPA Ofc. Of Solid Waste and Emerg. Response, and
Steven A. Herman, Ass’t Adm’r., EPA Ofc. Of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, to
EPA Regional Administrators, Regions 1-10, Nov. 26, 1997 (on file with author).
130. Professor Buzbee has proposed a “Cleanup Approval Process,” a federally-sanctioned
method of remediating brownfields sites that would parallel the structure of other federal envi-
ronmental laws.  See William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35,
100-04 (1995) [hereinafter Buzbee, Remembering Repose].
As Professor Buzbee later observed, “[c]ritical to rehabilitating Brownfields are questions
about which levels or units of government should be involved in such efforts.”  Buzbee, Institu-
tional Determinism, supra note 3, at 1.  Evolving notions of environmental federalism probably
require a split of responsibility between federal and state governments in this area.  See Daniel
C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 613 (1996) (noting that
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empower the EPA to approve states’ VCPs and extend liability pro-
tection to developers at sites in those states or adopt Professor Rob-
ert Abrams’ proposals designed to minimize federal involvement at
brownfields sites.131  Unfortunately, recent legislative proposals aim
to reduce the federal role in brownfields policy,132 so this type of leg-
islative action is unlikely.  Congress is moving in the wrong direction
for consistency with sustainable development’s “procedural integra-
tion” principle.
2.  Addressing Shortcomings of Localities’ Site-Specific 
Approaches
A second procedural problem stems from the fact that to each
stakeholder, the question about issues such as cleanup standards and
liability is the same: what is the impact of this project, on this neigh-
borhood, on this site?133  The potential consequences of a site-specific
inquiry are serious.  If a number of brownfields are located close to-
gether in an inner-city neighborhood, the parcel-by-parcel approach
ignores the potential synergistic effect of multiple sources of con-
tamination in proximity to each other.134  Some would argue that
                                                                                                                                     
“every regulatory decision represents a conglomeration of various policy activities, some of
which will benefit from decentralized processes and others of which will be optimized under a
centralized regime”).
131. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1028-30; Abrams, supra note 16, at
289-90.
132. The most recent CERCLA reauthorization bill, S. 8, the “Superfund Cleanup Accel-
eration Act of 1997,” would have prevented the EPA from disapproving state VCPs.  Once a
site was “subject to a state remedial action plan or . . . the state has provided certification or
similar documentation that response action has been completed under a state remedial action
plan,” federal civil and criminal actions would be barred.  S. 8, 105th Cong., §103 (proposing to
add CERCLA section 129).  The EPA could only evaluate state VCPs for the limited purpose
of deciding whether to award a state a grant from $25,000,000 in new funding authorized under
the statute.  Id. at § 102 (proposing to add CERCLA section 128); see also Eric D. Madden,
Comment, The Voluntary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment Act-The Limits of the Kansas
Brownfields Law, 46 KAN. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1998).  See generally Rhoads & Shogren, supra
note 33 (discussing brownfields provisions of S. 8 and S. 18, a stand-alone brownfields bill, and
noting administration opposition to the proposed role for the EPA).
133. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and Justice,
25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 589, 617-18 (1998) (“ [D]ecisions regarding cleanup standards
and liability [should be] dealt with from a community-based, rather than a parcel-by-parcel,
perspective.”).
134. For an excellent analysis criticizing Oregon’s brownfields statute on these grounds, see
Alexander H. Tynberg, Comment, Oregon’s New Cleanup Law: Short-Term Thinking at the
Expense of Long-Term Environmental and Economic Prosperity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 471
nn. 128 – 30 (1997) (“The law must not assume that the particular site under analysis is the only
source detrimentally affecting human health and the environment. Nevertheless, that is what
the new cleanup law does.”); see also Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 909 n.123
and sources cited therein (criticizing CERCLA risk assessments on these grounds).
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zoning frameworks ensure citywide analyses of brownfields projects.
As my former student Patrick Skelley has demonstrated, however,
rezoning is not necessary for most brownfields projects.135
The site-specific inquiry is antithetical to the community-wide
approach of evaluating environmental impacts that sustainable de-
velopment requires.136  As one brownfields proponent observes, “You
can’t address one isolated brownfield and expect it to survive
alone.”137  In a recent article, my colleague Michael Allan Wolf rec-
ognizes the need for a citywide approach to evaluating the impacts of
brownfields reuse and redevelopment.  He proposes a “Protective
Land-Use Scheme,” the “heart” of which is a new zoning classifica-
tion, the “Brownfield Investment Zone” (BIZ), to “create a uniform
method for assuring a zone of comfort around certain brownfields.”138
The BIZ proposal uses regulatory tools already in place and could
govern today’s brownfields experiments.  The same cannot be said of
citywide sustainability planning processes which are underway in only
a few cities (besides Chattanooga, notable examples include Seattle
and San Francisco).139  The BIZ proposal also uses a process which,
despite its well-known drawbacks,140 is oriented to contemplation of
                                                                                                                                     
Of course, there is widespread concern that current environmental laws fail to take ac-
count of problems posed by the interaction of multiple chemicals and the presence of multiple
sources of contamination.  See, e.g., Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework For Preventing
Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (1992) (“[T]he present
[environmental law] approach often fails to account for multiple sources of exposure.”); Robert
R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REV. 103, 121 (risk assessment policies “rarely take synergism into account”); William
D. Ruckelshaus, Twentieth Anniversary Commemorative: The Role of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 725, 725 (1992) (statement by a former EPA
Administrator that “[w]e know very little about the additive and synergistic effects of diverse
contaminants in our environment”).
135. See generally Patrick J. Skelley II, Public Participation in Brownfield Remediation
Systems, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 389 (1997).  Florida’s brownfields statute is relatively un-
usual in that it explicitly requires that a brownfields developer demonstrate that
“redevelopment of the proposed brownfield site is consistent with the local comprehensive plan
and is a permittable use under the applicable local land development regulations . . . .”  FLA.
STAT. ch. 376.80(2)(b) (1998).  As Skelley observes, the latter burden would not be difficult to
meet in most cases.
136. See generally Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1; Eisen, Brownfields of
Dreams, supra note 1.  But see Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism, supra note 41, at 82-83
(“[at] the project design stage [ ] we must respond in a ‘bottom up’ fashion, ensuring that de-
velopment takes place with sensitivity to the urban ecosystem.”) (footnotes omitted).
137. Pepper, supra note 92, at 26.
138. Wolf, supra note 7, at 40, 41.
139. See Sustainable Seattle (last modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.scn.org/sustainable/
susthome.html>; Sustainable City (last modified Mar. 28, 1999) <http://www.sustainable-city.
org/> (setting forth a “5-year Sustainability Plan for the City of San Francisco”).
140. As Professor Wolf observes, “zoning classifications are by no means chiseled in stone;
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citywide impacts in a forum that allows for public input.141  Thus, the
BIZ idea should receive further consideration as a practical alterna-
tive to the parcel-by-parcel approach to brownfields redevelop-
ment.142
B.  Brownfields Programs Require Procedures Designed To Ensure
Sustainable Urban Futures (“Substantive Integration”)
Professor Dernbach defines the second core concept of sustain-
able development law—the mandate to ensure a sustainable future—
as the requirement of “substantive integration.”143  The challenge is
“developing principles for determining appropriate trade-offs among
goals in specific decisions,” or ensuring that “the sum of many deci-
sions ought to further [social, economic, and environmental] goals.”144
In the brownfields setting, as Professor Wolf recognizes, this means
“accommodat[ing] the deep desire for economic growth in the inner
city and the need to protect human health and assure a cleaner urban
environment for current and future generations.”145
Is this balance being struck appropriately?  Consider a hypo-
thetical buyer of a brownfields site (“Purchaser”)  who wishes to buy
a brownfields site successfully remediated under an “industrial”
cleanup standard, raze the buildings on the site, and construct con-
dominiums.  Many states require a higher degree of cleanup for this
residential use.  Therefore, the state must guarantee that Purchaser
will do any additional cleanup necessary.  My point is a simple one
that is often overlooked or trivialized: brownfields remediation is not
                                                                                                                                     
a public use restriction placed on an industrial brownfield is only as permanent as the predilec-
tion of a majority of the local legislature.” Wolf, supra note 7, at 39.
141. See, e.g., Skelley,  supra note 135.
142. The new Florida brownfields statute comes close to this approach, requiring a local
government to adopt a resolution designating a “brownfield area,” “a contiguous area of one or
more brownfield sites, some of which may not be contaminated, and which has been designated
by a local government by resolution,” before redevelopment may proceed.  FLA. STAT. ch.
376.79(4) (1998).  The statute adopts the EPA’s definition of “brownfield sites”: “generally
abandoned, idled, or underused industrial and commercial properties where expansion or re-
development is complicated by actual or perceived environmental contamination.”  FLA. STAT.
ch. 376.79(3) (1998).
143. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at 51.
144. Id. at 52.
145. Wolf, supra note 7, at 23.  This formula reflects the ubiquitous phrase
“intergenerational equity” and its preference for avoiding deferring environmental damage to
the future.  See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989);
Edith Brown Weiss, Sustainable Development Symposium: A Reply to Barresi’s “Beyond Fair-
ness to Future Generations,” 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (1997) (defending the role of intergenera-
tional equity in sustainable development policies).
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sustainable development unless it ensures that urban residents will
enjoy a safe and healthy environment in the future.
To brownfields boosters, though, dealing with the past is what
matters.  Their view of the remediation process looks primarily to the
past: cleaning up contamination at abandoned sites to spur their re-
development and working around real or perceived barriers.  This is
not to say that the future is completely irrelevant.  State VCPs that
use generic cleanup standards make the future use of each site a con-
sideration.146  Beyond this, however, the future is of little import, as
little attention is paid to the condition of brownfields sites after initial
cleanups.
There are three primary concerns about the post-remediation fu-
ture of a brownfields site.  The first and perhaps the only one which is
adequately addressed in current programs is the likelihood that the
initial cleanup will fail.  In virtually every VCP statute, there is a re-
opener clause designed to guard against remedy failures by allowing
the state to vacate liability protection extended to a developer if the
remedy fails or if previously undiscovered contamination is found at
the site.147  At this early stage, there is limited hard evidence suggest-
ing states will diligently police brownfields sites with remedies in
place.  It seems more likely that states’ attention and limited en-
forcement resources will be diverted to more serious problems than
sites thought to be successfully remediated.  States already tout their
track records in getting sites back into commerce, but rarely mention
the steps taken to combat backsliding.148
The second concern is that the initial cleanup may not be suffi-
cient for a subsequent property use, as in my example involving Pur-
chaser.149  Many states rely on the common law of property, providing
146. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 941 n.247 (citing the examples of
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Michigan); Wolf, supra note 7, at 35 n.125 (citing Ohio’s regulations,
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-08(B)(3)(c)-(d)(1998), which promulgate different soil cleanup
standards for residential and commercial land uses).
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3)(b)-(c) (1998).
148. See, e.g., PENN. DEP’T. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM, OLD
SITES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES 1-6 (1998) (listing program achievements in the annual report but
not mentioning steps taken to protect against remedy failures).
149. See Tynberg, supra note 134, at 488 (criticizing the view that “so long as the remedy is
protective of health and the environment for all current exposure scenarios and for all exposure
scenarios that are reasonably likely to occur in the foreseeable future, there is absolutely no
valid reason why society should demand more” on the basis that “[i]ncorporating future use
into remedy selection is practically impossible because there is so much uncertainty involved
[and] [o]ne cannot ensure that any industrial area is ‘reasonably anticipated’ to remain indus-
trial in fifty years.”).
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that a limitation of the property to specified uses will be recorded
with the deed and run with the land.150  Professor Wolf and I argue
this servitude-based approach might not allow adjoining residents to
prevent undesirable impacts.151  In the failed SMOA guidance, the
EPA also found the use of common law tools insufficient.  It sug-
gested that states should reserve “authority to remove the cleanup
certification under certain circumstances, such as a change in the
site’s use, a failure of institutional controls, or the discovery of addi-
tional contamination.”152  Some statutes, such as Florida’s new brown-
fields statute, do include reopeners of this sort.153
The third important question is whether brownfields cleanups
will result in reduced urban pollution.  Experience to date shows in-
dustrial redevelopment is common at brownfields sites, raising the
possibility of “repollution.”154  Lessons From the Field’s case studies
demonstrate that industrial users are prized for jobs and tax revenues
they provide.155 Yet no developer need prove it will not contaminate a
site.  As one might imagine, the typical reopener clause does give the
state authority to pursue an enforcement action against a repol-
luter.156  Assuming the state was inclined to flex its regulatory muscle
at a brownfields site, which, as noted above, is not necessarily a good
assumption, it would face significant hurdles, including the problem
of distinguishing between historical and post-cleanup contamination.
This determination would be particularly difficult if the nature of the
development on the site was such that it obscured the contamina-
tion.157
150. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 949; Wolf, supra note 3, at 38.
151. Professor Wolf explains:
[A]s every first-year, property law student schooled in the intricacies of com-
mon-law servitudes could testify, the most common form of use restriction found
in private law—the real covenant— is an eminently unwieldy and unreliable
mechanism to bind subsequent purchasers of the brownfield parcel to the prom-
ises made by the original redeveloper.
Wolf, supra note 3, at 39.
152. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47500.
153. See FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3)(d)-(e) (1998); see also Koch, supra note 33, at 207.
154. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 3, at 22 n.90 (citing Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra
note 3, at 1004 n.552).
155. In eight case studies, the designated use of the site after remediation was “industrial”;
in several others, part of the site was dedicated to industrial uses.  See Pepper, supra note 92, at
5-6.
156. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 963 n.341 and statutes cited therein;
see also FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3)(e) (1998) (state can require additional cleanup upon the re-
lease of new contaminants at a site).
157. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1025 n. 675 and sources cited
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Marginalizing concern for the future in these ways mortgages the
sustainability of cities in favor of short-term gains.  Fortunately, one
commentator proposes a comprehensive solution to this problem.
Professor Wolf’s PLUS scheme contains a set of six features designed
to complement the zoning designation and ensure the protection of
brownfields cleanups.158  For example, to ensure that improper use is
not made of a parcel remediated to a use-specific cleanup level, he
proposes a “devastation easement,” a new form of conservation
easement in which “any inherent ‘right’ to develop or use the BIZ
parcel for anything other than industrial purposes will be transferred
. . . from the landowner to a governmental unit, preferably the state,
with local neighborhood organizations as co-owners.”159  To combat
the potential for repollution at brownfields sites, he proposes that
each developer post a performance bond that “could ‘roll over’ into a
‘perpetual maintenance’ policy, . . . .”160
These are excellent ideas directly oriented to achieving
“substantive integration” objectives.  I would add another: states and
localities must develop measurable indicators of progress to ensure
that brownfields initiatives are evaluated and updated in a meaning-
ful way.161  Professor Ruhl sees this as critical to an adaptive approach
to attaining sustainability, observing:
                                                                                                                                     
therein.
158. The goals of PLUS are to “(1) protect[ ] local residents from the increased risks attrib-
utable to brownfields remediation at lower-than-CERCLA levels, and (2) guarantee[ ] that
only industrial uses will be permitted on the reused site.” The complete set of features includes
the following:
(1) “devastation easements,” (2) CIS-enhanced brownfields inventories; (3) a
“Megan’s Law” for brownfields, even formerly contaminated, reused sites; (4) ease-
ments or set-asides in fee to create buffer zones; (5) pre-construction bonds to guaran-
tee remediation completion and to fund perpetual maintenance; and (6) environ-
mental awareness and safety programs.
See Wolf, supra note 3 at 42, 44-47.  But see Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at
1023-24 (calling for enhanced risk communication programs, similar to the sixth element of the
PLUS scheme).
159. Wolf, supra note 3 at 44.
160. Id. at 47.  The ASTM’s “Standard Guide to the Process of Sustainable Brownfields
Redevelopment” encourages developers to maintain environmental insurance for this purpose.
See Standard Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 6.
161. I am hardly alone in calling for the development of appropriate sustainability indica-
tors.  See, e.g., Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at; Ruhl, Thinking of Envi-
ronmental Law, supra note 1, at 997-98.  Indicators allow for an evolutionary approach to sus-
tainability policies:
By establishing numerical goals and indicators for topics such as economic viability or
environmental quality, a state or city can contrast current development conditions
with desired performance, show trends over time, allow comparisons between differ-
ent regions, judge the sustainability of current practices, and develop new indicators if
necessary.
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As Professor James Salzman has posited, . . . valuations of ‘nature’s
services’ can be used to create indices of ecosystem sustainability,
which, when combined with improved economic and social sustain-
ability indices, can be used the same way Wall Street uses stock
performance indices to make adaptive decisions.162
Developing “indices of ecosystem sustainability” is obviously not
something accomplished overnight.163  The type of indicators needed
is radically different from any information currently available in the
brownfields arena, which suffers from the “‘bean counter’ mentality”
often used to evaluate the performance of environmental laws.164
States measure success by such indicia as the number of applications
to take part in a VCP and the number of sites remediated.165  This is
the wrong benchmark for an adaptive policy approach because it
does not value “nature’s services.”166
C.  The Link Between Brownfields Policies And Environmental
Justice Is Still Tenuous (“Equity”)
Finally, a commitment to sustainable development is incomplete
without attention to the “equity” component of sustainable develop-
ment.167  Environmental justice advocates tend to perceive brown-
fields programs in a manner that differs from the view taken by the
adamant supporters of those programs.  Adamant supporters see
                                                                                                                                     
Sustainable Development Explored In Virginia, supra note 63, at 1.  See also Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 997 (terming indicators indispensable to an adaptive ap-
proach); Elizabeth Kline, Why Sustainable Community Indicators?: People Need A Reality
Check (last modified November 13, 1998)  <http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/articles
/whysust.htm> ([I]ndicators “ensure that incremental steps are moving in desired directions and
. . . hold . . . [people] accountable for choices  . . . .”).
162. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 999 (citing James Salzman,
Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming)).
163. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52 n.89 (discussing the “difficulties of developing
criteria to measure sustainable development” and citing PETER BARTELMUS, ENVIRONMENT,
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES OF SUSTAINABILITY (1994));
see also Lash, supra note 2, at 84.
An interesting information source about indicators is Indicators of Sustainability (visited
July 8, 1998) <http://www.subjectmatters.com/indicators/HTMLSrc/Indicators.html>.
164. See Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 997.
165. See, e.g., PENN. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION,  supra note 148, at 1-2 (setting forth
the number of remediated sites and program applications in Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling
Program); see also New Jersey Brownfields Law Wins Muted Praise, THE BROWNFIELDS
LETTER, Nov. 1998, at 3 (citing a “potential increase in [brownfields] development,” based on a
comment of legislative analyst Terri Smith that the New Jersey DEP “signed 1,342 memoran-
dums of agreement, . . . up from 1,112 in the same period of 1997”).
166. See Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 999.
167. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290 n.52 (“social equity is
the important third leg of sustainable development policy”).
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economic opportunity in the “distressed property market,” promot-
ing the “3R’s” for success: remove barriers, redevelop, and reap the
rewards.168  To environmental justice advocates, the core question is
very different.  They ask “will brownfields reclamation provide tan-
gible benefits, in terms of economic development or environmental
quality, for the communities where brownfields are located, or will
reclamation mostly benefit investors from outside the communi-
ties?”169
Community activists are in a “double bind”170 because they must
decide whether brownfields programs will provide hope and oppor-
tunity to distressed neighborhoods, or exacerbate environmental con-
tamination (with cleanup standards lower than CERCLA’s171) and
make investors wealthy at the expense of urban residents.  Brown-
fields has become big business, yielding lots of “green” to an entire
cottage industry of investors, lawyers, engineers, financial analysts,
and consultants172 that reaps profits from brownfields remediation.
Profits are often more important to brownfields entrepreneurs than
168. See Kibel, supra note 133, at 612.  Even the PCSD’s summary of brownfields pro-
grams’ raison d’etre concentrates on eliminating barriers to redevelopment; neither the recom-
mendation, the action items, nor the report text mentions “equity” or “environmental justice.”
See SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 8.
Applying the 3R’s standard, some brownfields boosters remain unsatisfied with the incen-
tives packages, liability limits, and relaxed cleanup standards of VCPs.  See, e.g., Koch, supra
note 33, at 205 (noting that critics such as Robert Wells believe “Florida’s Act still lacks ade-
quate incentives for developers.”); New Jersey brownfields law, supra note 165, at 4 (describing
large industrial companies as “unimpressed” by New Jersey’s brownfields program).
169. Kibel, supra note 133, at 605-06.  For other discussions of advocates’ concerns, see
Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1000-20; Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in the
Name of Environmental Justice: A View From State Government, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 769
(1995); Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal: A Comment on the Urban Redevelop-
ment Aspect of Brownfields Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1996); Wolf, supra note 3, at
21-26.
170. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 21-26 (discussing the clash in philosophies that creates an
environmental justice “double bind” in brownfields policies); see also Kibel, supra note 133, at
607-08 (“[o]n the one hand, brownfields reclamation provided an opportunity to clean up and
improve economic and environmental conditions in many poor and minority neighborhoods.
On the other hand, brownfields reclamation also called for less stringent cleanup standards and
shielding banks and investors from remediation liability.”).
171. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 936-49 for an analysis of “risk-
based” cleanup standards that allow brownfields sites to be remediated to levels less than those
required by § 121 of CERCLA and its state analogues; see also Wolf, supra note 3, at 32.  As
one observer puts it, “[i]nterest in brownfields redevelopment . . . is moving cleanup standard
policy in a new direction,” that being the substitution of “risk-based” approaches for those con-
servative standards based on “worst-case scenarios.”  Kass et al., supra note 17, at 348.
172. See, e.g., Standards Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 5 (terming Michael Taylor, the
chair of the ASTM committee drafting the brownfields standard, a “brownfields development
consultant”).
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community concerns about fast-track project approvals or reduced
cleanup standards.173  As one resident of a San Francisco neighbor-
hood put it:
As far as I’m concerned, a brownfield is just a Superfund site.  Afri-
can-Americans bore the brunt of the poison and pollution when
they were Superfund sites, but now they are not going to be a part
of cleanup and redevelopment. From my neighborhood’s perspec-
tive, brownfields redevelopment means that African-Americans are
being passed over and moved out.174 
I have observed that “environmental justice advocates who view
streamlined and lenient cleanup processes as adding to the commu-
nity’s environmental burden may be on a ‘collision course’ with
brownfield redevelopment proponents.”175  However, as another
commentator observes, the two camps are not at “opposite ends on a
spectrum of good and evil.”176  Communities often need private sector
capital to make projects work and investors need community ap-
proval to make some projects viable.
Closing the gap between these groups by requiring states to ad-
dress legitimate community concerns might satisfy environmental jus-
tice advocates.  But would it achieve “equity” in the sustainable de-
velopment context?  The best answer is a qualified “yes, for now.”  In
his article for this special issue, Professor Ruhl discusses the relation-
ship between environmental justice and sustainable development’s
“equity” component.177  This is a welcome development.  To date,
those scholars who have discussed the relationship between the two
173. A presenter at the EPA’s “Brownfields ‘97” conference summed up the situation as
follows:
[T]here are profits to be made for shrewd real estate investors who can envision the
market value of the property after cleanup, buy it very low at a stigmatized price, im-
plement project cleanup, obtain agency sign offs, and then sell the property at only a
small reduction in sales price or value.
Kass et al., supra note 17, at 346.  In this respect, brownfields investors resemble stock market
speculators who “flip” stocks by buying and selling them quickly, with little regard for a com-
pany’s welfare.  See, e.g., Kibel, supra note 133, at 612.  For these investors, community support
or lack thereof may be a factor in the profit calculus, but not something to dwell upon.  Id.  (“In
the pages of [the] Brownfield News [newsletter], one is not likely to find discussion of economic
equity, public participation, or environmental racism. These issues simply fall outside the in-
vestment scope of the publication.”).
174. See Kibel, supra note 133, at 609.
175. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1003.
176. Kibel, supra note 133, at 612.
177. See J. B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Jus-
tice: Cooperation, then Competition, then Conflict 9 DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y F. 161
(1999)(hereinafter Ruhl, Co-Evolution).
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have done little more than note common themes178 or assume a link
without much analysis.179
“Equity” and “environmental justice” overlap in significant
ways.  In a democratic society, protecting the environment for future
generations cannot be done without attention to legitimate distribu-
tional concerns.180  However, as Professor Ruhl demonstrates ably,
there are differences between the two.181  The former was originally
grounded in the tension between developed and developing nations182
and in the evolving concept of intergenerational equity.183  The latter
began as a piercing response to inequities in siting of hazardous waste
facilities and similar concerns.184  Both Professors Ruhl and Dernbach
conclude that “equity” is broader than the set of concerns advanced
by the American environmental justice movement.185  “It is quite pos-
sible,” Ruhl says, “that the law of sustainable development will even-
tually catch up with and then subsume the law of environmental jus-
tice.”186  In this issue, he examines how that may occur.187
For now, I address environmental justice advocates’ concerns
about brownfields policies, recognizing that achieving “equity” will
178. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 51, at 618-20.
179. See, e.g., Robin Morris Collin & Robert Collin, Where Did All the Blue Skies Go?
Sustainability and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 399, 445 (1994) (arguing
that environmental justice is an indispensible component in the quest for urban sustainability).
For a contrary perspective, see Kent E. Portney, Environmental Justice and Sustainability: Is
There a Critical Nexus in the Case of Waste Disposal or Treatment Facility Siting?, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 827, 827 (“[T]he pursuit of environmental justice may, at least conceptu-
ally, undermine goals of sustainability.”)
180. See Torres, supra note 51, at 618-19.
181. See Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 177, at 182-85.
182. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 16; Eisen, Toward a Sustain-
able Urbanism, supra note 41, at 3 (sustainable development can “address equity concerns,
such as achieving a just distribution of resources between developed and developing nations.”);
SHABECOFF, supra note 47, at 198-199; Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52-53 (noting that
“sustainable development has been adopted . . . in an effort to bridge the North-South or rich-
poor environmental gap  . . .”).
183. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 51, at 620.
184. See generally Torres, Id. at 51 (discussing the history and evolution of the environ-
mental justice movement).  There is considerable literature on the environmental justice
movement and its goals and objectives.  See, e.g., Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3,
at 1002 n.540 and sources cited therein.
185. See Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10510; Ruhl, Co-Evolution,  note 177, at
15.  A recent book on the “ecology of place” states that “community sustainability,” a move-
ment in its infancy, “may offer a useful and unifying framework . . . in which the health of the
larger community is what becomes most important.”  See BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8,
at 34-36.  This political vision would transcend the concerns of one individual or group.
186. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290 n.52.
187. See generally Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 177.
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require even more attention.  One policy path to this goal might be to
apply current laws to brownfields programs.  There is no well-defined
body of “environmental justice law” per se, but rather a scattered set
of pronouncements that reinterprets existing laws, such as Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, to address environmental justice issues.188  As
Professor Ruhl observes, it is still far too soon to predict the eventual
shape of environmental justice law,189 and adopting its current legal
proxies would require us to deal with all the uncertainties about the
effectiveness of laws not designed specifically to address environ-
mental justice concerns.190  We would be better off enumerating spe-
cific core principles, incorporating them in brownfields programs, and
revisiting them if necessary.
Perhaps the most important core principle is broad-based public
participation in brownfields remediation efforts, which is both consis-
tent with Agenda 21191 and important for a VCP’s success.  Professor
Wolf notes: “[t]here is . . . strong sentiment that public participation
is the public policy component that most efficiently addresses envi-
ronmental justice concerns” at brownfields sites.192  The National En-
vironmental Justice Advisory Council’s report on environmental jus-
tice and brownfields policies calls for expanded public participation,193
188. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290 n.50 (discussing the
EPA’s regulations and the lower court’s decision in Chester v. Seif); see also Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), judgment vacated as moot,
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif,  119 S.Ct. 22 (1998).  For a forceful
criticism of the EPA Title VI policy, see Henry Payne, Green Redlining: How Rules Against
“Environmental Racism” Hurt Poor Minorities Most of All, REASON, Oct. 1998, at 26.
189. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290. In 1998, the Supreme
Court could have offered welcome clarification, but eventually did not do so.  It accepted the
case of Chester v. Seif, which would have explicitly tested the limits of Title VI in environ-
mental justice cases; however, the Court subsequently dismissed the case as moot.  See Chester,
supra  Note 188, at 22.
190. See, e.g., id. at 290 n.51 (questioning whether the disparate impact or discriminatory
intent standard of Title VI will be applied in environmental justice cases).
191. See Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at n.52 (citing paragraph 23.2 of Agenda 21)
(“One of the fundamental prerequisites for achievement of sustainable development is broad
public participation in decision-making.”). But see Kal Raustiala, Note, The “Participatory
Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 566 (The
“Rio Declaration states that ‘[E]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.’”).
192. Wolf, supra note 3, at 27.
193. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, Waste and Facility Siting Subcom-
mittee, Environmental Justice, Urban Revitalization, and Brownfields: The Search for Authentic
Signs of Hope (last modified Sept. 3, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/pdf/nejacpdf.htm>.
The NEJAC is the EPA’s “formal advisory committee to assist the agency in the furtherance of
its environmental justice objectives,” and “is composed of representatives from grass root envi-
ronmental justice organizations, industry, non-governmental organizations, state, local, and
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as does the draft ASTM standard.194  Three years ago, I called upon
states to provide “meaningful input by the surrounding community”
in the two areas typically of most concern to them: “decisions on site
uses and cleanup activities.”195  At the time, public participation was
not widely accepted because public outreach efforts could threaten to
delay a project interminably, perhaps even causing a developer to
abandon it.  Many perceived it as incompatible with the streamlining
spirit of VCPs.196  As noted earlier, many state brownfields statutes
reflected this attitude, providing few if any public input opportuni-
ties. 
However, there has been a sea change in opinion.  Proponents
have now come to believe public participation is essential for projects
to succeed.  In a recent article, a team of policy analysts concludes,
“Community relations can make or break a brownfields project.”197
Lessons From The Field demonstrates the importance of public par-
ticipation, stating that,
In almost every case study analyzed, carefully orchestrated public
outreach and involvement plans were implemented from the outset.
Without this critical community buy-in, many project participants
note, their efforts could easily have fallen apart.198
There is still a lag between reality and law, however, in that most
state statutes still require little more than nominal public participa-
tion, and most public outreach efforts are done through ad hoc
groups or task forces convened for particular projects.199  Where de-
velopers undertake public outreach efforts without a framework to
constrain their activities, one person’s “carefully orchestrated” out-
reach can easily become another’s “illegitimate process.”
                                                                                                                                     
tribal governments, and academia.” See Torres, supra note 51, at 617.  See also Wolf, supra note
3,at 27 (discussing the NEJAC’s activities).
194. See Standards Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 5.
195. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1000 n.525 and sources cited
therein.  See also Kass et al., supra note 17, at 347 (identifying different opinions about future
site uses and cleanup standards as two of “three recurring areas of tension” in brownfields
projects between developers and communities).
196. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1003-04; Wolf, supra note 3, at 28.
197. Kass et al., supra note 17, at 347.  See also Standard Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 5
(citing comments of consultant Michael Taylor that “[a]lthough developers often have little
patience for broad community discussion of cleanup and redevelopment plans, . . . large corpo-
rations . . . trying to extricate themselves from environmental liability . . . understand the need
for community participation . . .”).
198. See PEPPER, supra note 92, at 18.
199. See id.  (citing the example of the redevelopment of a site in Minneapolis where a task
force provided public support).
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The obvious response to this problem would be to incorporate
meaningful public participation requirements in state statutes.  Flor-
ida’s brownfields statute, adopted in 1997, is noteworthy for aiming
to do just that.200  Under that statute, environmental justice advocates
have opportunities for input in the public hearing supporting a local-
ity’s designation of a “brownfield area” for redevelopment (when a
hearing is necessary),201 and the deliberations of an “advisory commit-
tee” established to make recommendations about the cleanup of an
individual site.202
I have proposed “Community Working Groups” for brownfields
redevelopment,203 so one might expect me to endorse Florida’s advi-
sory committee concept.  However, Florida’s approach has significant
shortcomings.  There is no requirement that governmental officials
respond to community members’ concerns about future site uses and
cleanup standards.  The advisory committee has no role in approving
redevelopment plans204 or setting cleanup standards.205  The latter is
200. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 376.79(8) (1998) (defining “[e]nvironmental justice” as “the
fair treatment of all people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies”); id. ch.
376.78(7) (expressing legislative intent that “[e]nvironmental justice considerations should be
inherent in meaningful public participation elements of a brownfields redevelopment pro-
gram.”); id. ch. 376.80(4) (establishing an advisory committee process to, inter alia, “receiv[e]
public comments  . . . on environmental justice”).
In her Comment, Tara Burns Koch argues the Florida statute effectively responds to my
environmental justice concerns and those of Professor Georgette Poindexter.  Koch, supra note
34, at 218.  There is no question that the Florida statute is a “significant step in recognizing and
alleviating these concerns,” as Ms. Koch claims.  Id. at 219.  However, as I discuss in the text, it
lacks certain key features that would lead me to agree completely with her.
201. The designation of a “brownfield area” is a prerequisite to the statutory process for
redevelopment and a public hearing on this designation is necessary if “a local government
proposes to designate a brownfield area that is outside community redevelopment areas, enter-
prise zones, empowerment zones, closed military bases, or designated brownfield pilot project
areas, . . . .” FLA. STAT. ch.  376.80(2)(a) (1998).
202. See FLA. STAT. ch. 376.80(4) (1998).  The relevant portion of the statute states:
Local governments or persons responsible for rehabilitation and redevelopment of
brownfield areas must establish an advisory committee for the purpose of improving
public participation and receiving public comments on rehabilitation and redevelop-
ment of the brownfield area, future land use, local employment opportunities, com-
munity safety, and environmental justice.  Such advisory committee should include
residents within or adjacent to the brownfield area, businesses operating within the
brownfield area, and others deemed appropriate.  The advisory committee must re-
view and provide recommendations to the board of the local government with juris-
diction on the proposed site rehabilitation agreement provided in subsection (5).
203. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1017-20.  The CWG would “provide
input on actions taken at all stages of the voluntary cleanup process . . . .” Id. at 1017.
204. Ms. Koch recognizes this shortcoming, calling for legislative change to “ensur[e] the
community not only has a voice but also a vote in approving a proposed redevelopment plan.”
Koch, supra note 33, at 219.
226 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:187
particularly unfortunate because Florida eschewed generic cleanup
standards in favor of setting the cleanup standard anew at each site.206
Because the local government establishes the committee’s member-
ship, it could put politics before participation.  There is no guarantee
the committee’s input will be respected nor is there a requirement to
consider the committee’s recommendations or modify the site
cleanup agreement if the comments suggest inadequacies.  The com-
mittee is reduced to employing whatever ability for political persua-
sion it has available.
As I have noted, in order for environmental justice concerns to
be fully incorporated in the brownfields redevelopment process, the
affected community must be a partner, not a mere sounding board.207
While states such as Florida have made good starts in this direction,
their efforts are insufficient.
There are two indispensable elements for meaningful public par-
ticipation.  First, rather than deferring to brownfields developers’
judgments, states should enshrine broad-based frameworks that in-
volve community members as full participants in every stage of the
redevelopment process.  Paul Kibel has suggested one intriguing
model that resembles my “Community Working Group” proposal:
“Restoration Advisory Boards” (“RABs”) designed to provide
community input on environmental issues in the military’s base clo-
sure process.208  Unlike ad hoc task forces or advisory committees, the
RABs are directed by statute to involve community members
throughout the process.209
                                                                                                                                     
205. See FLA. STAT. ch. 376.81 (1998).
206. See Koch, supra note 33, at 222.  As Ms. Koch recognizes, this does obviate my con-
cern regarding the political legitimacy of setting generic cleanup standards on a statewide basis,
at least in Florida.  
207. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1000-20; Poindexter, supra note
171, at 1 (advocating a “stakeholder theory” approach to brownfields redevelopment).  See also
Kibel, supra note 133, at 617; McWilliams, supra note 104, at 773-77; Skelley, supra note 135, at
392-93.  But see Gauna, supra note 97, at 50 (calling for reinvention of public participation
mechanisms to promote environmental justice).
208. See Kibel, supra note 133, at 617-18.  See also Major Stuart W. Risch, The National
Environmental Committee: A Proposal to Relieve Regulatory Gridlock at Federal Facility Super-
fund Sites, 151 MIL. L. REV. 1, 100 (1996) (calling a failed CERCLA bill of the 104th Congress
from which I derived the CWG concept an attempt to “establish[ ] CWGs, local panels that
would replace entities like the Restoration Advisory Boards (RAB) previously used by the
DOD.”).
209. See 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d)-(f) (1998) (describing the establishment of RABs and their
functions).  A RAB must be consulted on a wide range of issues, including:
(1) Identifying environmental restoration activities and projects at the installation
or installations.
(2) Monitoring progress on these activities and projects.
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Second, the scope of current public participation efforts often
puts the cart before the horse.  These efforts should be structured to
define redevelopment plans for entire cities as well as for individual
brownfields sites.  Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, many brown-
fields projects do not come to fruition under the umbrella of a com-
munity-wide scheme for growth.
The brownfields redevelopment process is beginning to resemble
earlier high-profile urban redevelopment efforts such as urban re-
newal and enterprise zoning.210  At the outset, proponents claim to in-
volve stakeholders in community-based efforts to decide the fate of
each city.  Nevertheless, the process becomes politicized.211  Lessons
From The Field, the recent report by the nonprofit Northeast Mid-
west Institute about 20 case studies of brownfields redevelopment,
identifies “critical ingredients for success” that include the city be-
coming a “‘brownfields broker,’ essentially helping interested buyers
acquire [sites]”; providing financing to make projects viable; and es-
tablishing private-public sector partnerships.212  The report suggests,
without any trace of irony, that “partnerships between project par-
ticipants and politicians” are important.213  As one early commentator
on brownfields policies feared, corporations and developers are
making deals with local politicians that effectively shut out public in-
put.214
                                                                                                                                     
(3) Collecting information regarding restoration priorities for the installation or in-
stallations.
(4) Addressing land use, level of restoration, acceptable risk, and waste manage-
ment and technology development issues related to environmental restoration at
the installation or installations.
(5) Developing environmental restoration strategies for the installation or installa-
tions.
Id. at § 2705(f).  See also Major David A. Wallace et al, Contract Law Developments of 1997—
The Year In Review, 1998 ARMY LAW. 10, 84 (describing revised regulations regarding provi-
sion of technical assistance to RABs).
210. See Kibel, supra note 133, at 608 (Environmental justice advocates’ “[s]kepticism
about brownfields reclamation was based on . . .  the negative experiences of many communi-
ties with urban renewal policies . . . aimed at improving housing and economic development in
inner cities [that] failed to achieve their goals.”).
211. Professor Wolf describes how “politics as usual” has come to pervade the process of
selecting U.S. cities for Empowerment Zones, which he terms a “sweepstakes.”  See Wolf, su-
pra note 3, at 29-30.
212. Pepper, supra note 92, at 15-17.
213. Id.  at 17.
214. See McWilliams, supra note 104, at 771.  See also Kibel, supra note 133, at 612
(“[T]here is concern that the brownfields issue is being economically and politically hijacked by
interests that have no connection with, or true concern about, the communities they claim to be
helping.”).
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Sustainable development requires us to reject this ad hoc, politi-
cized approach to urban redevelopment.  Lessons From The Field
notes, “brownfield initiatives should dovetail with a community’s
‘vision’ for growth.”215  The process of articulating that vision should
feature public input.  An example of a more inclusive sustainability
planning process is that of Chattanooga, where “[t]he city has
achieved economic prosperity, greater social equity, and a higher
quality environment by using a broad-based citizen involvement
process to set and achieve goals.”216  However, while broad-based
public participation processes are important, we must heed Professor
Wolf’s caution about relying on public outreach efforts as a
“panacea.” The other reforms discussed in this Article are important
as well.
                                                                                                                                     
Consider this example of Pfizer Inc.’s 1998 announcement that it would build a research
facility in Connecticut: “Before announcing it would build a facility in New London, Pfizer
worked out a wide-ranging deal with the state and local officials covering financial incentives,
community development and liability.” Pfizer provides return on cleanup investment, THE
BROWNFIELDS LETTER, Nov. 1998, at 1.  The state recruited Pfizer, extending it incentives to-
taling almost $75 million, including $9 million for complete remediation of the site under the
state’s brownfields program.  Id.  See also Tom Condon, Sweet Smell of Success Drifting Into
New London, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 1, 1998, at A3; Robert A. Hamilton, In the Re-
gion/Connecticut; Pfizer Reaches Across the Thames for More Space, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998,
§ 11 at 7 (explaining the Pfizer deal). 
It is hard to dispute the positive impact of a facility bringing 1,500-2,000 jobs to a city with
a moribund economy.  See Tom Condon, Football? No, This Is ‘Folly’ Ball, HARTFORD
COURANT, Dec. 15, 1998, at A3 (contrasting the Pfizer deal with the proposal to expend state
funds to build a stadium in Hartford to lure a pro football team) (“I support the state’s $65 mil-
lion investment in New London, because it will bring 2,000 high-paying Pfizer biotech jobs,
great spinoff potential and a new state park . . . .  The stadium isn’t anywhere near as good a
deal.”)  See also Tina Cassidy, Conn. OK’s Patriots Stadium, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1998, at
A1 (describing the stadium deal).
Because the Pfizer project was effectively a “done deal” before its announcement, how-
ever, there was little real opportunity to examine its environmental impacts in local fora.  That
precludes us from terming even a project as meritorious as Pfizer’s “sustainable development.”
215. PEPPER, supra note 92, at 18.
216. Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10508.
Spring 1999] BROWNFIELDS POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES 229
IV.  CONCLUSION
As Professor Ben Boer has noted, “[t]he question of sustainabil-
ity will continue to be high on the political agenda in coming years.”217
The only real remaining question of any significance is how to man-
age the discussion’s end game.
For now, the link between brownfields and sustainability must be
more than something built on assumptions.  Attaining the societal
goal of sustainable development requires institutions at all levels of
government to implement strategies to ensure that economic devel-
opment, social goals, and environmental regulation go hand in hand.
The failure of state VCPs and federal policies to reach this level is
readily apparent when one evaluates these laws and policies under
the three core principles for implementing sustainability.
The upcoming National Town Meeting provides an excellent op-
portunity to recognize a strong connection between brownfields poli-
cies and sustainable development by declaring a goal of making these
core principles part of the foundation of every state VCP and federal
brownfields program.  To those who would respond that “sustainable
development” is too vague or the specifics of implementing it in the
brownfields arena elude definition or agreement, my response is sim-
ple: follow my reform proposals and those advocated by commenta-
tors Wolf, Buzbee, Abrams, Kibel, and Poindexter, and the rest may
well take care of itself.
217. Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 358.
